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TRAIN WRECKS AND FEWAY CRASHES:
AN ARGUMENT FOR FAIRNESS AND
AGAINST SELF REPRESENTATION IN THE
CRIINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
MARTIN SABELIT & STACEY LEYTON"
In early 1998, as the trial of Theodore Kaczynski ap-
proached, the public learned of a profound conflict between
the accused Unabomber and his well-respected team of defense
attorneys. For several weeks, the public, previously sensitized to
the realities of self representation by the trial of Colin
Ferguson,' watched as Kaczynski and his attorneys struggled
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I Colin Ferguson, accused of shooting nineteen individuals on the Long Island
Railroad (killing six), exercised his right to represent himself in order to present a
fantastic defense theory that could only have been the product of a deep-seated psy-
chosis. SeeJan Crawford Greenburg, Delusional Clients Challenge Lauo'ers, CHI. TtUB.,
Jan. 11, 1998, at C3. Directly at odds with the testimony of numerous eyewitnesses,
Ferguson argued to the jury that an unknown white man had stolen his firearm while
he was asleep and conducted the shooting rampage of which he stood accused. Id.
Ferguson's theory and manner rendered absurd the nationally televised trial.
Ferguson's original counsel (who Ferguson believed to be part of a conspiracy to
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over control of the defense. Federal Public Defenders Judy
Clarke and Quinn Denvir had concluded that Kaczynski suf-
fered from a severe mental disease and that professional ethics
compelled them to present evidence of this disease in the hope
of saving him from the death penalty.2 Kaczynski, in contrast,
affirmed his own sanity and the importance of his acts as strate-
gic means for accomplishing an urgent political objective. This
struggle, therefore, seemed to pit the most fundamental of
norms of professional ethics-zealous advocacy-against the most
fundamental expression of individual autonomy-the dignity of
the person. The struggle between Kaczynski and his counsel
also implicated the fundamental purpose of our criminal justice
process: the capacity to assign criminal responsibility in the con-
text of a life-and-death determination.
cause him to go blind to prevent him from identifying the real murderer) had urged
a variation of the insanity defense. See Ronald L. Kuby & William M. Kunstler, So
Crazy He Thinks He is Sane: The Colin Ferguson Trial and the Competency Standard, 5
CORNELLJ. L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 20 (1995).
2The severity and even the existence of Kaczynski's mental disability have been
the subject of dispute. Dr. SallyJohnson, a respected prison psychiatrist, rendered a
provisional diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia in her forensic evaluation of Kaczyn-
ski. Dr. SallyJohnson, Psychiatric Report, United States v. Theodore John Kaczynski,
No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 611123, at *34 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998). This diag-
nosis was in accord with defense psychiatrists, who concluded that Kaczynski was delu-
sional and paranoid schizophrenic. Id. at *17-18. A recent book by Michael Mello, a
former capital defense attorney who corresponded with Kaczynski after his convic-
tion, argues that Kaczynski was sane and that those who concluded that he was
schizophrenic rested their judgment on disapproval of his political ideology and life-
style. See generally MICHAEL MELLO, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VERSUS THEODORE
JOHN KACZYNSIu (1999). Interestingly, those who preferred to view Kaczynski as a po-
litical dissident rather than as insane found themselves lending a fair amount of cre-
dence to his political views. James Q. Wilson, for example, maintained that
Kaczynski's Manifesto was well argued and rational, and claimed that, "[i]f it is the
work of a madman, then the writings of many political philosophers-Jean Jacques
Rousseau, Tom Paine, Karl Marx-are scarcely more sane." William Finnegan, Defend-
ing the Unabomber, THE NEwYORKER, Mar. 16, 1998, at 61 (quotingJames Q. Wilson).
sThe conflict was diverted by a semi-operatic finale followingJudge Burrell's rul-
ing that defense counsel had the authority to present a mental health defense over
Kaczynski's objection. See Pre-Trial Transcript, United States v. Theodore John Kac-
zynski, No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 3338, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 1998); William
Glaberson, Assault on Unabomber Defense Cites Defendant's Wishes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1998, at A10. Judge Burrell's ruling prompted Kaczynski to request substitution of
counsel and then, when Judge Burrell denied this request, to assert his right to self
representation. See Official Trial Transcript, United States of America v. Theodore
John Kaczynski, No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 4657, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1998).
Judge Burrell denied Kaczynski's request, in a highly questionable ruling that raised
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It is not surprising that Kaczynski resisted his counsel's ef-
forts to present evidence of mental illness; it is a natural, human
instinct to resist being branded crazy. Nor is it surprising that
committed advocates like Denvir and Clarke differed from their
client's assessment of his own mental welfare and were deter-
mined to present the only defense they thought might save Kac-
zynski's life.
4
It is surprising, however, that our criminal justice system did
not have the capacity to resolve this conflict in a manner which
allowed Kaczynski to maintain his dignity, authorized Clarke
and Denvir to advocate zealously on Kaczynski's behalf, and fa-
cilitated the fact finder's determination of Kaczynski's mental
state. Each of these functions corresponds to a fundamental
the prospect of a successful appeal based on the denial of the right to self representa-
tion. See Paul Van Slambrouck, Kaczynski Trial Ended Before Questions Could Be An-
swered, CRnisnA T Sci. MoNrroR, Jan. 26, 1998, at 3. This prospect effectively forced
both Kaczynski and the prosecution to settle the case-not as a consequence of delib-
eration, but inspired by the potential for disaster from their respective perspectives:
Kaczynski's fear of being labeled mentally ill in a public forum and the prosecution's
fear of a successful appeal based upon denial of self representation. See Harriet
Chiang & Kevin Fagan, Government Strikes Best Deal Possible: Case Risked Being Overturned
on Appea=4 S.F. CHRON.,Jan. 23, 1998, at A8;Jenifer Warren, The Unabomb Plea Bargain,
L-A. Tmss, Jan. 23, 1998, at A24; William Booth, Kacynski Pleads Guilty to Bombings,
WASH. PoST,Jan. 23, 1998, at Al.
The Ninth Circuit recently rejected Kaczynski's challenge to his conviction, in
which Kaczynski claimed that his guilty plea iwas rendered involuntary by the denial of
his request to represent himself and by his attorneys' decision to present evidence of
his mental illness. See United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F. 3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2001). In a
decision authored by Judge Pamela Rymer, the court held thatJudge Burrell had not
erred in concluding that Kaczynski's request for self representation was made for
purposes of delay and thereby denying it. The court declined to decide whether at-
torney or client controls the decision whether to present mental state evidence to the
jury, but rejected Kaczynski's claim on the ground that his willingness to allow such
evidence at the penalty phase undermined his contention that presentation of the
evidence was unbearable. Id. Judge Reinhardt dissented, praising the district judge's
effort to ensure the fairness of Kaczynski's trial but concluding that his denial of the
request for self representation was contrary to controlling law. Id. at 1119-20, 1127-
28.
4The Kaczynski defense team argued that Kaczynski's inability to tolerate psychiat-
ic examination and presentation of evidence of mental disability was a direct result
of his mental disability. See Defendant's Opposition to Motion to Preclude Expert
Mental Health Testimony at Guilt Phase and to Require Defendant to Undergo a
Mental Examination Before Sentencing, United States v. Theodore John Kaczynski,
1997 WL 716546, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 1997) (CR-S-96-259GEB) (Kaczynski had
"pathological dread of examination by psychiatrists"); id. at *10 (Exhibit A, Declara-
tion by Dr. David Vernon Foster, M.D.) ("deeply ingrained fear of being considered
mentally ill" was "essential component of... [his] disorder").
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value of the criminal process-personal dignity, zealous advo-
cacy, and accurate fact-finding-which, in concert, reflect the
humanity and fairness of the criminal process.5 The fact-finding
function in particular-understood as the capacity to assign
criminal responsibility as intended by applicable laws-defines
the concept of justice. From this perspective, the criminal pro-
cess failed Kaczynski, his counsel, and the public.
This failure is particularly surprising because the Kaczynski
dilemma is not sui generis. An increasing number of mentally ill
individuals enter the criminal process at the local, state, and
federal level each year, and, as in the Kaczynski case, resist pres-
entation of evidence of mental illness. The conflict between
Kaczynski and counsel, in fact, exemplifies an increasingly fre-
quent conflict between competent yet severely disturbed crimi-
nal defendants and their counsel over control of the defense.
This conflict often occurs over presentation of evidence of men-
tal illness and very often, as in the Kaczynski case, involves the
assertion of the right of self representation.
This article focuses on one aspect of this dilemma: a defen-
dant's abuse of the right to self representation in order to block
presentation of mental health evidence. The right to self repre-
sentation, recognized in Faretta v. California, effectively endows
mentally ill defendants with the power to veto the decision to
present evidence of their mental illness.6 This power, in prac-
tice, filters relevant evidence of mental illness from the fact-
finding process and does so by focusing the inquiry on the valid-
ity of the waiver rather than the fairness of the trial. The Faretta
right, in brief, fixes the judicial gaze on autonomy and away
from justice, as suggested by Judge Reinhardt:
We thus become ajudiciary "with eyes wide shut." The whole course of
proceedings, most particularly the trial, is rendered irrelevant for consti-
tutional purposes despite the fact that it is wholly apparent to any judge
reading the transcript that it was marred by a series of egregious errors,
5Personal dignity and accurate fact-finding should be viewed as first order values
or interests, and zealous advocacy as a second order value in that it serves or facilitates
these first order values. Within the logic of the adversarial process, however, the task
of determining facts accurately cannot be accomplished in the absence of zealous ad-
vocacy.
6 See generaUy Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
7 See generalyJudge Stephen Reinhardt's special concurrence in United States v.
Farhad, 190 F.Sd 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
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any one of which could have inhibited a fair determination of guilt or
innocence, and despite the fact that it was equally apparent at the time
of the waiver that the defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial would
be remote. Such was the case here and, as required by Faretta, we have
averted our gaze-as one might from a train wreck or a freeway crash-
from Farhad's pitiful attempt to, in his own words, "make a more glori-
ous kind of a defense.
"s
In this article, we join our voices to the growing chorus of
judicial officers, practitioners, and commentators who question
the legitimacy and wisdom of Faretta because the right of self
representation in practice undermines the fairness of the crimi-
nal process. This is particularly true in cases involving mentally
ill defendants who are nonetheless deemed competent to stand
trial under the competency standard established in Dusky v.
United States and Drope v. Missouri9 In this connection, Faretta
has been recently limited to self representation at the trial stage,
and even at the trial stage, Faretta has been challenged in light
of mounting evidence that it empowers criminal defendants to
subvert, intentionally or unintentionally, the process."'
In our opinion, the right to self representation, together
with confusion in the case law (over defense counsel's authority
to present evidence of mental illness) and ethical canons,
maximizes both the frequency of attorney-client conflicts over
presentation of mental health evidence and the potential of
these conflicts to distort the fact-finding process. Ultimately,
this failure of the criminal justice process flows from the pro-
found philosophical tension in our legal and moral tradition be-
tween respect for individual autonomy, which militates toward
maximizing the control of the accused person over her fate, and
our commitment to justice, which demands 7neaningful repre-
sentation within the adversarial process.
ROADMAP
This paper explores the legal and ethical contours of this
struggle in the rapidly expanding context of cases involving
8 Id at 1102.
9 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171
(1975).
10 There are strong suggestions in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152
(2000), that some members of the Court may be open to reconsidering Faretta. See
notes 204-205 infra and accompanying text.
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mentally ill criminal defendants. We suggest that fairness re-
quires the presentation of all evidence of mental disability rele-
vant to determining criminal intent even if the client opposes
this presentation. In Section I, we define the problem: a crimi-
nal justice system increasingly overloaded with mentally ill indi-
viduals who wrestle with counsel over control of the defense.
These clients, by virtue of their right to self representation, dis-
tort the fact-finding process by effectively filtering out evidence
of mental illness relevant to the issue of criminal intent. We de-
fine this filtering process as a fairness issue and trace its origin
to (1) the tension between the Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel and self representation and (2) the lack of clarity, un-
der case law and ethical canons, regarding the allocation of
authority within the attorney-client relationship.
In Section II, we conclude that the fairness issue has been
obscured by the tendency of scholars and courts to frame the
conflict solely in terms of a client's autonomy interest as bal-
anced against her best interests, and that courts have almost
uniformly focused on autonomy. Both have substantially un-
dervalued a shared, societal interest in the integrity and fairness
of the criminal justice process. We advocate, in Section III, that
society's interest in the fairness of the proceedings by which
culpability is measured be given a higher value on the theory
that all persons associated with the criminal process-either as
participants in a criminal case or as residents of the jurisdiction-
have an interest in ensuring that the process would accord each
of us the fullest measure of justice. From this perspective, we
advocate that the criminal process ensure that the trier of fact
consider important evidence related to guilt or punishment
even over an individual defendant's opposition. This rationale
for allocating these decisions to counsel is far more weighty
than the individually focused best interests argument.
Finally, in Section IV, we propose three major reforms to
the criminal justice system in order to restore the proper bal-
ance among these values and interests. First, this paper identi-
fies a category of exculpatory evidence-evidence of mental
illness-that must be presented to a trier of fact in order to guar-
antee the integrity of the criminal justice process. We propose
that the authority to present such evidence over a defendant's
objection-in the form of an insanity plea, a diminished capacity
defense, or as mitigation at sentencing-must be clearly allocated
[Vol. 91
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to defense counsel.' Second, we propose that Farettas recogni-
tion of an absolute right to self representation be overruled.
Finally, in order to protect a defendant's autonomy interest and
personal dignity, we propose the bifurcation of criminal trials in
order to allow the presentation of both the defense preferred by
the mentally ill defendant, and, in the event that this defense
fails (as it almost surely will), the defense preferred by defense
counsel. 2 These solutions would, in concert, best vindicate so-
ciety's interest in avoiding adjudication of guilt or imposition of
sentence without consideration of crucial exculpatory or miti-
gating evidence. In this connection, it is significant that a
criminal defendant may be denied the Faretta right where the
trial court finds that he will not maintain the order or decorum
of the courtroom. s This limitation on the Faretta right is signifi-
cant-and instructive for the purposes of this article-because it
demonstrates that the societal interest in order and decorum
justifies a limitation on the right of self representation. Why,
then, should not the societal interest in fairness justify such a
limitation?
4
l1Although Judge Burrell ruled that Kaczynski's attorneys enjoyed this authority,
he was stepping onto thin ice. Ethical codes and case law fail to clearly allocate this
decision-making authority. See notes 26-76 supra and accompanying text.
12Infringing personal dignity, particularly in the context of mentally ill persons,
may result in a range of injuries from the psychological to the physical. Kaczynski, for
example, reportedly attempted suicide in response to the judicial ruling that his law-
yers could interpose a mental health defense over his objections. See MELLO, supra
note 2, at 89-90, 109.
13Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
14 The answer is, in the opinion of the authors, clear. Nonetheless, we realize that
our perspective might be misinterpreted to justify reform of the criminal process in
favor of "truth seeking." Paradoxically, this paper could be interpreted as coinciding
with the perspective of the "Truth School" that all relevant evidence, including evi-
dence obtained in violation of the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment,
should be presented to the trier of fact. See, e-g., AM REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION & CRDHIINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997); Paul G. Cassell, The
Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L
REv. 175 (1999); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions-and from Miranda, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998). This paper.
however, departs from a very different premise than that of the Truth School. First,
we believe that fairness, not "truth," is the objective of the criminal process. Second,
we believe that fairness follows from a balanced, adversarial process. The Truth
School, in contrast, pursues an objective notion of "truth" defined independently of
the adversarial process.
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I. PYRRHIC VICTORIES: COMPETENCE, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE
STRUGGLE OVER CONTROL OF THE DEFENSE
As discussed above, state and federal criminal justice systems
face mounting numbers of mentally ill individuals who exercise
their Faretta right (or threaten to do so) in order to block the
presentation of evidence of mental illness. Because this evi-
dence is highly relevant to the issue of criminal intent, this
widespread abuse of the Faretta right distorts the fact-finding
process to the detriment of the holders of that right.
This distortion flows from three sources of confusion: first,
the inherent tension between the Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel and self representation; second, the low standard of
competency required to stand trial (or, rather, the lack of dis-
tinction between competency to stand trial and competency to
elect self representation); and third, the lack of clarity, under
case law and ethical canons, regarding the allocation of author-
ity within the attorney-client relationship. The interplay be-
tween these three sources of confusion maximizes the potential
for conflict over control of the defense and the corresponding
distortion of the fact-finding process.
A. GIDEON V. FARETTA: THE INHERENT TENSION BETWEEN THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE RIGHT TO SELF REPRESENTATION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the effective assistance of counsel to all persons fac-
ing loss of life or liberty through the criminal justice process.15
This guarantee provides the foundation for the relatively re-
cently discovered procedural rights to counsel, Gideon v. Wain-
right, 6 and to self representation, Faretta v. California.'7 Despite a
These differing premises lead to very different analyses. Based upon our defini-
tion of the objective of the criminal process, we seek to preserve the adversarial na-
ture of the process which, in our opinion, requires presentation of relevant evidence
of mental illness. In contrast, in the Fourth Amendment context, we believe that ex-
clusion of illegally obtained evidence preserves the adversarial nature of the process
because exclusion of such evidence serves the adversarial process through policy-that
is, by discouraging police misconduct. There is no analogous policy consideration
favoring exclusion in the context discussed in this paper.
15U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
16 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extend-
ing Gideon to any case in which a sentence of imprisonment is imposed).
17422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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common constitutional foundation, these procedural rights
serve distinct substantive rights and constitutional interests.
The right to counsel helps to ensure the integrity of the crimi-
nal justice process-a common, societal interest embodied both
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and in the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment. The right to self representation, in contrast, protects the
autonomy of the accused-an individual, personal interest re-
flected in the structure of the Sixth Amendment itself.
In this sense, the right to counsel and the right to self repre-
sentation have existed in philosophical tension during their
relatively brief lives. This philosophical tension may play a con-
structive role in the criminal justice process; Clarence Gideon,
after all, secured the right to counsel acting pro se"8 This ten-
sion may, however, play a much less desirable role in the crimi-
nal justice process when the Faretta right is exercised by a person
of significantly lesser, or less organized, mental resources than
Mr. Gideon. In such cases, the Faretta right has allowed, even
encouraged, mentally ill, often paranoid criminal defendants to
forego court-appointed counsel. In this way, the Faretta right of-
ten corrupts the criminal process by replacing trained and ex-
perienced counsel with an autonomous yet ineffective advocate.
One adversary, in effect, is removed from the adversarial process
in the name of autonomy.
The central truth of the post-Faretta attorney-client relation-
ship, therefore, is that a defendant may elect self representation
if she perceives her counsel to be unwilling or unable to ad-
vance her personal, political, or religious agenda.' 9 In this way,
the Faretta right injects an element of negotiation between at-
torney and client over the strategy and objectives of representa-
tion and, if important disputes arise, the negotiation has the
potential to undermine, distort, or altogether destroy the attor-
ney-client relationship. This reality makes sense if our only goal
is individual autonomy.
18 Gideon, of course, did not "exercise" a "right" to represent himself. He had no
choice. On retrial, when represented by counsel, Gideon was acquitted. SeeANrIM"om
L~mis, GIDEON'S TRuNPET 223-38 (1964).
19Currently, courts may not limit the Farelta right even to protect a defendant's
right to a fair trial. See notes 161-63 infra and accompanying texL
20001
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B. BIGGER THAN A BREADBOX, SMALLER THAN YUGOSLAVIA: THE
STANDARD FOR COMPETENCY TO ELECT SELF REPRESENTATION
UNDER GODINEZ
The Faretta right may be exercised by any criminal defen-
dant who is deemed competent to stand trial and makes a know-
ing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. The test for
competence, as defined by the Supreme Court, is whether the
defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his law-
yer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him., 20 The defendant's understanding of the proceed-
ings must be sufficient to allow him to consult with his lawyer
and assist in preparing a defense.2' Many commentators have
suggested that the standard is unreasonably low and allows indi-
viduals whose ability to reason is severely clouded by a mental
illness or other disability to be found competent.2 2 The inade-
quacy of the competency standard may in large part be attribut-
able to the reality that "decision-making about defense strategy
encompasses cognitive skills and capacities for rational thinking
20Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
21Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). It is constitutionally permissible to
require the defendant to prove that he is incompetent, see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375, 385-86 (1966), but if it is the defendant's burden then a clear and convincing
evidentiary standard is not permissible. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355-56
(1996). Most defendants who undergo competency examinations are found compe-
tent to stand trial. See Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead
Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 571, 578 (1995) (75% to 96% of defendants who submit to examina-
tions are found competent).
22One study found that, while fewer than one-third of the criminal defendants di-
agnosed with major mental illnesses were found incompetent by a court-appointed
psychiatrist, in over two-thirds of these cases defense attorneys doubted their clients'
capacity to participate in their own defense. RichardJ. Bonnie et al., Decision-Making
in Criminal Defense: An Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client
Competence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48, 52-53 (1996). Defense counsel sus-
pected that rational decision-making was impaired in 63% of the cases, the ability to
understand the charges in 37%, and the ability to understand the nature and purpose
of a criminal prosecution in 44%. Id. at 53. See also Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacAr-
thur Adjudicative Competence Study: Development and Validation of a Research Instrument, 21
LAw & HUM. BEHAVIOR 141 (1997) (attorneys doubt client competence in 8% to 15%
of felony cases).
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that assisting counsel, as defined in Dusky and Drope, does not
require. "23
In the decades following the Faretta decision some courts
held that due process required a higher standard of competency
when a defendant elects to represent himself.4  In 1993, how-
ever, in Godinez v. Moran, the Supreme Court rejected any no-
tion that an enhanced competency standard is constitutionally
required and concluded that the decision to waive counsel does
not require an appreciably higher level of rational functioning
than the decision to waive other trial rights.0 Therefore, as long
as a defendant meets the minimal standard of competence es-
tablished in Dusky, she is by definition competent to represent
herself at trial.
C. THE CURRENT ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITYNWITHIN THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Given this constitutional arrangement, conflicts develop
regularly between attorneys and clients over whether to present
relevant evidence of mental illness. While in the past there was
some recognition that a mentally ill defendant was not in the
position to decide to forego presentation of such evidence, in-
23 Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and
Drope, 47 U. MLAIU L. REv. 539, 567 (1993).
24 See Blackmon v. Armontrout, 875 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The standard
for determining whether a person is capable of making a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the right to counsel is not coextensive with the test for determining compe-
tency to proceed to trial"); United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 250 (6th Cir.
1987) (competency required to waive counsel is "vaguely higher" than competency to
stand trial, but non-disabled, literate, defendant who had high school education and
was fluent in English was clearly competent); United States ex reL Konigsberg v. Vin-
cent, 526 F.2d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1975) ("standard of competence for making the deci-
sion to represent oneself is vaguely higher than the standard for competence to stand
trial"). In a decision that was overturned by the Supreme Court. the Ninth Circuit re-
lied on such reasoning: "A defendant is competent to waive counsel or plead guilty
only if he has the capacity for 'reasoned choice' among the alternatives available to
him." Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992). Many of these decisions
cited language from two older Supreme Court cases suggesting that such a higher
standard might be required. See NVestbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150, 150 (1966) (per
curiam): Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
25 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993). In Godin., justice Blackmun,
joined by Justice Stevens, dissented and argued that the competency standard should
be a functional inquiry, measuring the understanding needed based on the context.
Id. at 412-13, 416.
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creasingly since the 1970s, courts have proved unwilling to over-
ride a defendant's autonomy and have therefore afforded re-
spect to a defendant's choices. Thus, courts have increasingly
refused to allow imposition of an insanity plea against a defen-
dant's wishes and declined to require presentation of mitigation
in capital proceedings. This judicial restraint is typical even
where it is clear that the defendant is pursuing a self-destructive
path that renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair and in-
complete.
1. Case Law
The Decision to Plead Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. Before
the 1980s, some courts allowed the interposition of an insanity
plea upon an unwilling defendant. The courts of the District of
Columbia, where a disproportionate number of cases involved
an insanity defense (for reasons that invite creative speculation),
emerged as proponents for both sides of the debate over this is-
26sue.
In a series of decisions that became known as "the Whalem
approach," the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that,
"when there is sufficient question as to a defendant's mental re-
sponsibility at the time of the crime ... in the pursuit ofjustice,
a trial judge must have the discretion to impose an unwanted
[insanity] defense on a defendant ....,' State courts in Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, and Washington followed the Whalem ap-
proach, and allowed the entry of insanity pleas and the presen-
26 See The Right and Responsibility of a Court to Impose the Insanity Defense Over the De-
fendant's Objection, 65 MINN. L. REv. 927, 928 n.5 (1981).
27Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818-19 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In the most
well-known of this series of cases, a defendant refused the insanity defense recom-
mended by his attorney and instead insisted on asserting a racial or political justifica-
tion for murder and other crimes. See United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148,
1158 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Although no federal courts followed the District of Columbia
Circuit's approach, the language in some ineffective assistance of counsel cases has
suggested that little weight should be afforded the wishes of a mentally ill defendant
who resists an insanity plea. See, e.g., Brennan v. Blankenship, 472 F. Supp. 149, 156-
57 (W.D. Va. 1979) ("It is no answer... that [the defendant] conclusively rejected an
insanity defense.... [Ilt can scarcely be said that defense counsel discharged their
professional responsibility by allowing their case to be guided simply by the unin-
formed wish of their client to avoid a long period of mental commitment... . Under
any professional standard, it is improper for counsel to blindly rely on the statement
of a criminal client whose reasoning abilities are highly suspect.").
[Vol. 91
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tation of evidence of mental illness against defendants' wishes.!
In contrast, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals became
the most well-known proponent of the opposite position
(termed "the Frendak approach"), which insisted that as long as
a defendant's rejection of an insanity defense was "voluntary
and intelligent" the court had no right to impose such a de-
fense.29
In the 1980s, courts ultimately reached a consensus that the
decision to enter an insanity plea belonged solely to the crimi-
28See, e.g., People v. Merkouris, 297 P.2d 999, 1008-09 (Cal. 1956) (error to allow
withdrawal of insanity plea in light of conflicting evidence about defendant's sanity at
time of crime and trial); People v. Bolden, 160 Cal. Rptr. 268, 270 (Cal. Ct App.
1979) (attorney may take over client's decisions when he doubts client's sanity); Les v.
Meredith, 561 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Colo. 1977) (upholding a trial court's discretion to
enter insanity plea "irrespective of the defendant's wishes"); State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d
754, 760-61 (Me. 1968) (proper for judge to deny defendant permission to withdraw
insanity plea when defense counsel opposed motion); Walker v. State, 321 A.2d 170.
174 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) ("Where... the court has before it uncontradicted,
competent evidence that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the
offenses, it would be a manifest injustice to allow the withdrawal of a plea of insanity.
..."); List v. State, 308 A.2d 451, 456 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (holding it is within
defense counsel's authority to enter insanity plea despite defendant's explicit opposi-
tion, because it is a "matter of trial strategy"); State v. Pautz, 217 N.W.2d 190, 192-93
(Minn. 1974) (proper forjudge to raise insanity defense on own motion, though evi-
dence of mental disability in this case was insufficient); State v. Hermann, 283 S.W.2d
617, 620 (Mo. 1955) ("Evidence of insanity may be admitted even against the vill and
objection of defendant if his friends or counsel set up this defense."); State v. Khan,
417 A.2d 585, 590 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1980) (even if defendant is found com-
petent, court must follow his wishes to waive insanity defense only if his decision is
voluntary and knowing); State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 262 n.62 (NJ. 1987) (ap-
proving jury instruction on insanity although defendant had waived this defense);
People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400, 405-07 (N.Y. 1981) (not ineffective assistance for at-
torney to argue insanity defense rather than actual innocence); People v. Baxter, 302
N.Y.S.2d 456, 457-58 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (allowing for possibility that judge may
impose insanity defense upon defendant of questionable competency); State v. Smith,
564 P.2d 1154, 1159 (Wash. 1977) (upholdingjudge's decision to impose insanity de-
fense upon competent defendant).
29Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 367 (D.C. 1979). The Frendah "voluntary
and intelligent" inquiry focused on the defendant's state of mind at the time that he
entered a plea rather than at the time of the offense itself. Id. at 379-80. The Su-
preme Court's only explicit discussion of the permissibility of imposing such a plea
occurred in Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1962), in which the Court in-
terpreted a statute not to allow mandatory commitment when an insanity defense was
imposed on an unwilling defendant, and raised the possibility of constitutional prob-
lems with an alternative reading. Only the Lynch dissent discussed whether imposi-
tion of the insanity defense was even permissible, arguing that it was. Id. at 720
(Clark, J., dissenting) -
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nal defendant. This trend was influenced in large part by two
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the 1970s,
Faretta v. California and North Carolina v. Alford, ° which were in-
terpreted as sending a strong message about the value of a
criminal defendant's individual autonomy.3 Shortly thereafter,
in the 1980s, society's commitment to the insanity defense also
began to wane. These legal developments seriously under-
mined the notion that society's interest in avoiding conviction
of the mentally ill could justify imposition of an unwanted de-
fense, and many of those jurisdictions that had afforded courts
the power to do so reversed themselves. Other decisions since
30 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (upholding the right of self rep-
resentation for competent defendants); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39
(1970) (upholding acceptance of guilty plea by defendant who insisted on his inno-
cence of the crime but wanted to enter the plea to avoid the death penalty).
31 Commentators have viewed Alford as emphasizing autonomy at the expense of
societal concerns because it permits a defendant to maintain his innocence but
"choose" to enter a guilty plea in order to reduce the likely punishment. This logic
subordinates a justice interest-namely, the accurate determination of culpability-to
an autonomy interest-the right to govern one's own choices.
It should be noted that Faretta and Aford, the maximum expressions of the auton-
omy interest, did not involve insanity defenses and, for that reason, do not directly
address the balance at issue in this article between the justice interest and an auton-
omy interest weakened by the mental disability of the accused person. As recognized
by one appellate court analyzing the relevance of Faretta and Aford in the context of a
mentally ill defendant:
When a criminal defendant's sanity is subject to question, doubt is cast not only on
his competence to stand trial but also on the very capacity of our legal system to assign
blame. The issue becomes whether ... he can be considered an autonomous, choice-
making actor deserving blame for alleged wrongdoing. Protection granted a competent
individual's choice has no bearing on this issue, which basically challenges the justification
for punishment.
United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1980). It is clear, then, that
Alford's reasoning assumed the full exercise of reason by the accused person in sharp
contrast to the Kaczynski scenario presented in this article. In this sense, the juris-
prudence of Alford-its subordination of the justice interest to the autonomy interest-
should be distinguished from the balance to be struck in the Kaczynski context.
32 See United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reasoning
that Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the importance of defendant autonomy
and abandonment of insanity defense by many jurisdictions justified the overruling of
Whalem); People v. Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Cal. 1975) (distinguishing Merkouris
on the ground that there was a doubt as to the defendant's competency); Treece v.
State of Maryland, 547 A.2d 1054, 1062 (Md. 1988) (overruling List); State v. Debler,
856 S.W.2d 641, 655 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (defense counsel must "implement[] the
client's decision" to not raise mental defect defense); State v. Cecil, 616 A.2d 1336,
1344 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (upholding defendant's waiver against counsel's
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1980 have uniformly rejected courts' power to impose such a
defense,3 with the exception of one decision by the Supreme
Court of Colorado that relied on a unique statutory provision al-
lowing defense counsel to impose an insanity defense with court
approval.' Accordingly, the only modem decisions that place
any limitation upon what is otherwise absolute deference to a
defendant's decision to forego entry of an insanity plea are this
single, statutory-based decision and a handful of Sixth Amend-
ment cases that hold that attorneys should fully investigate the
defense so that, if the defense is warranted, they can strongly
advise a defendant to accept it-in order to ensure that a defen-
dant's refusal, if it persists, will at least be fully informed.!
advice); People v. Morton, 570 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("[C]ounsel
had no authority to pursue any defense other than the one authorized by defen-
dant"); State v.Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Wash. 1983) (overruling Smnith).
s3See Edwards v. United States, 795 F.2d 958, 963 (11" Cir. 1986) (reasoning that
the decision to raise the insanity defense belongs to defendant and attorney, not to
the court); Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1289 (11" Cir. 1984) ("[G]iven Al-
vord's competency.... [his attorney] was ethically bound to follow his client's vdshes"
and to not assert an insanity defense); Foster v. Marshall, 687 F. Supp. 1174, 1176
(S.D. Ohio 1987) ("[N]ever will a court be authorized by the Constitution to impose
an attorney's will on an unwilling, rational defendant"); Jacobs v. Commonwealth,
870 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Ky. 1994) (concluding that the insanity defense may not be
raised if defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived it). Other
courts have dismissed defendants' claims on appeal that the trial judge should have
imposed an insanity defense due to evidence of mental illness. See United States v.
Moody, 763 F. Supp. 589, 606 (M.D. Ga. 1991); United States e rel. Laudati v. Ter-
nullo, 423 F. Supp. 1210, 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Courts have also dismissed defen-
dants' claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to insist on entry of an
insanity plea against their wishes. See Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683, 685-86
(4th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel Martin v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 529, 530 (3d Cir.
1972).
Despite this trend in the case law, one survey concluded that approximately one-
third ofjurisdictions that have insanity defenses allow imposition of the defense un-
der certain circumstances. See Robert D. Miller et al., Forcing the Insanty Defense on
Unwilling Defendants: Best Interests and the Dignity of the Law, 24J. PSYCHIATRY & L, 487.
500-01 (1996).
34SeeHendricks v. People, 10 P.3d 1231, 124244 (Colo. 2000).
See Brennan v. Blankenship, 472 F. Supp. 149, 156-57 (W.D. Va. 1979) (ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel to forego development of insanity defense because of cli-
ent's opposition, when strong psychiatric testimony would have supported defense);
Mendenhall v. Hopper, 453 F. Supp. 977, 986-87 (S.D. Ga. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1342
(5" Cir. 1979) (inadequate investigation and advice to client regarding viable insanity
defense constituted ineffective assistance of counsel). These decisions may reflect
courts' discomfort with deferring to a defendant's refusal to permit presentation of a
meritorious defense. Alternatively, they may be cases in which the courts suspect that
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Treatment of Mental Health Issues in Capital Sentencing. The
treatment of cases involving death sentences has followed a simi-
lar trend. In the 1980s, state courts in California and NewJersey
overturned death sentences that, in line with the defendants'
wishes, had been imposed without any presentation of mitigat-
ing evidence.36 These courts reasoned that a death sentence is
illegitimate if imposed without an individualized inquiry into
the circumstances of the crime and the characteristics of the de-
fendant. In California, however, the Supreme Court later re-
versed itself and now will not vacate a death sentence merely
because an attorney has presented no mitigating circum-
stances.37 Moreover, no federal courts and few state courts have
followed this line of reasoning. Many have held that a compe-
tent defendant has the right to waive presentation of any miti-
gating evidence.38 In fact, in at least three cases the United
States Supreme Court has upheld death sentences in cases in
which the defendants had blocked the presentation of any case
for mitigation, in one case going so far as to lift a stay of execu-
tion that had been imposed to allow the defendant's mother to
the failure to present an insanity defense was primarily the product of defense coun-
sel's laziness rather than the defendant's intransigence. Moreover, despite the suc-
cess of some ineffective assistance claims, courts have generally been unsympathetic
to defendants who appeal based on decisions for which they bear some responsibility,
and unwilling to "reward" defendants for errors that they themselves have caused. See
Alvord, 725 F.2d at 1289; Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1343-44 (1 1h Cir. 1983);
Snider, 292 F.2d at 685-86; Debler, 856 S.W.2d at 655; State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115,
123-24 (Mo. 1981); Morton, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49.
36 See People v. Deere (Deere I), 710 P.2d 925, 933-34 (Cal. 1985); State v. Koeda-
tich, 548 A.2d 939, 993-94 (N.J. 1988).
s7 See People v. Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d 248, 262-63 (Cal. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1015 (1995); People v. Howard, 824 P.2d 1315, 134547 (Cal. 1992); People
v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 592-94 (Cal. 1990); People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 718-19
(Cal. 1989). See also People v. Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 149-50 (Cal. 1990) (upholding
Faretta's application to capital sentencing phase, despite societal interest in reliable
penalty determination).
38See, e.g., People v. LaValle, 697 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); State v.
Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d 1231, 1236-39 (Ohio 1999); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654,
657-59 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829 (1999); Mize v. State, 501 S.E.2d 219,
230 (Ga. 1998); Wallace v. State, 893 P.2d 504, 510-13 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Koon
v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 249-50 (Fla. 1993); Morrison v. State, 373 S.E.2d 506, 509
(Ga. 1988). The Georgia Supreme Court left open the possibility that a court may
have an independent obligation to investigate evidence. See Morrison, 373 S.E.2d at
509.
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present evidence that the defendant was seriously mentally ill.39
Thus, at a minimum, an attorney is not constitutionally required
to override a defendant's wishes and present a case for mitiga-
tion.
As in the insanity defense cases, a few courts have used inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims as a vehicle to address the
problem of imbalanced sentencing proceedings, and have held
attorneys who failed to present any mitigating evidence ineffec-
tive under the Sixth Amendment.0 Rather than confront the
question whether an attorney should present such evidence
against a defendant's wishes, however, many of these decisions
have instead relied primarily on the failure of an attorney to in-
vestigate mitigating circumstances, noting that this failure pre-
vents the attorney from "knowing what evidence . . . [the
defendant] was foregoing" and from "advis[ing him] ... fully as
to the consequences of his choice .... "" They have therefore
avoided the more difficult question of what an attorney who has
thoroughly investigated and found mitigating evidence should
do when a client insists that no such evidence be presented.2
39See Lambert v. Vargas, 525 U.S. 925 (1998) (vacating stay of execution granted
to allow defendant's mother to present "next friend" petition); see also Lenhard v.
Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 809-10 (1979) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (allowing defendant who
had represented self at trial and prevented standby counsel from presenting any miti-
gating evidence to waive all remaining appeals); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S.
299, 306-08 n.4 (1990) (rejecting challenge to constitutionality of state death penalty
statute and upholding death sentence despite defendant's decision to present no evi-
dence of mitigation at penalty phase, although some relevant evidence had been in-
troduced during the guilt phase); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990)
("The implication of the Court's decision in Blystone... is that one can choose to
forego the presentation of mitigation evidence even over the contrary advice of coun-
sel and the warnings of the court.").
40 See Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 906 (7 " Cir. 1996); Eutzy v. Dugger. 746
F. Supp 1492 (N.D. Fla. 1989). In Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1563-64 (10 Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1099 (1995), the court held that an attorney's failure to
present any mitigating evidence was deficient performance even though the defen-
dant had said he wanted no mental health or family history presented. but rejected
the ineffective assistance claim on the ground that no prejudice had been shown.
41Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501 (1l ' Cir. 1991). Sre also Thompson v.
Wainvright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11't Cir. 1986); Eutzy v. Dugger, 746 F. Supp. 1492.
1497-1500 (N.D. Fla. 1989).
In fact, in some of these decisions the courts have indicated that, once an attor-
ney has investigated and advised a client, he must defer to whatever the client desires.
See, e.g., Blanco, 943 F.2d at 1502 ("[A]lthough the decision whether to use such evi-
dence is for the client, the lawyer first must evaluate potential avenues and advise the
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Moreover, the cases in which representation has been de-
fective despite conformance with client wishes are in the minor-
ity; in far more cases, courts have held that as long as a
defendant has told his attorney that he does not want mitigation
evidence presented he cannot later complain of the attorney's
failure to convince the jury that his life should be spared. 3
Some of these decisions have explicitly rejected the notion that
a death sentence may not be imposed without the presentation
of mitigation evidence, or explicitly stated that an attorney
should defer to a client under these circumstances.44 However,
while following a client's wishes will generally insulate an attor-
ney against an ineffective assistance claim, this does not neces-
sarily make it the best course of action. 5 Drawing conclusions
client of those offering potential merit"); Thompson, 787 F.2d at 1451 ("[T]he deci-
sion whether to use such evidence in court is for the client") (citation omitted).
43 See Wallace v. Ward, 191 F.3d 1235, 124748 (10' Cir. 1999) (counsel did not
challenge prosecution's presentation or present mitigating evidence in accord with
client's wishes); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1383 (9" Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118
S.Ct. 208 (1997) (in accord with defendant's wishes, lawyer presented no mitigating
evidence and told court that defendant wanted death sentence);Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5
F.3d 1180, 1197 (9" Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191 (1994) (defense counsel
presented minimal mitigation evidence in respect for defendant's wishes); Silagy v.
Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1007 (7th Cir. 1990) (defendant represented self, offered no
mitigating evidence, and requested death sentence); Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358,
360-61 (5"' Cir. 1984) (attorney presented no mitigating evidence). For decisions
resting in part on approval of the strategic decision and in part on respect for defen-
dant preferences, see Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 290-91 (5'h Cir. 1987) (ap-
proving decisions in accord with defendant's wishes not to present psychiatric or
family testimony, when relatives were unavailable and both were reasonable tactical
decisions); Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 889-90 (11"' Cir. 1985) (finding no inef-
fective assistance for attorney failure to present mitigating witnesses, when defendant
wanted to leave family alone and family appeared unresponsive to attorney's over-
tures). For state cases upholding death sentences in such circumstances, see Ander-
son v. State, 574 So. 2d 87, 94-95 (Fla. 1991); Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 279-80
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 393-95 (La. 1982); Bishop v. State,
597 P.2d 273, 274-76 (Nev. 1979). Many of these cases have relied on an estoppel or
invited error rationale. See People v. Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d 248, 7 Cal.4th 988, 1013
(Cal. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015 (1995); People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 49 Cal.3d
991, 1029-30 (Cal. 1989). Concerns about defense counsel "sandbagging" the penalty
phase have also driven such an analysis. See Felde v. Blackburn, 817 F. 2d 281, 284
n. 3 (5th Cir. 1987); Trimb/e, 693 S. W.2d at 279.
44 See, e.g., McKaskle, 727 F.2d at 362 ("If... [the defendant) knowingly made the
choices.... [his lawyer] was ethically bound to follow ... [the defendant's] wishes.").
45Some courts that held attorneys effective nonetheless used language that im-
plies that the decision to present mitigating evidence is a strategic one and belongs to
the attorney, suggesting that while the attorney was not ineffective for failing to pres-
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from ineffective assistance cases is further complicated by the
fact that in those cases in which an attorney decides to override a
defendant's decision and offers mitigating evidence, the issue is
less likely to arise on appeal. Such a decision would decrease,
rather than increase, the likelihood that a death sentence would
be imposed. Therefore, while there are many reported deci-
sions evaluating whether it is ineffective to accede to defen-
dants' preference for death, there are none that consider
whether it was ineffective to refuse to respect such feelings."'
Diminished Capacity. The lack of clarity in the law as to
whether a defendant may block presentation of evidence of
mental illness is at its worst in cases addressing the decision
whether to present a mental health defense that mitigates cul-
pability.47 The absence of controlling or even persuasive author-
ent the evidence he would have had the authority to do so. See, e.g., Mitchel 762 F.2d
at 890 ("It is important to note that Mitchell's attorney did not blindly follow
Mitchell's command to leave his family out of it."). Some courts have, in the course
of rejecting ineffective assistance claims, even suggested that overriding the defen-
dant's wishes and presenting a case for mitigation may be the preferred course of ac-
tion. SeeJeffries, 5 F.3d at 1198 (explaining that, while ABA standards suggest that the
attorney should have presented mitigating evidence, they are only a guide and do not
establish ineffectiveness); Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 752 (1 V, Cir. 1988) (noting
"that other lawyers may have employed another strategy" and acknowledging that "it
is a close question" whether the attorney was ineffective for failing to present mitigat-
ing evidence). Other decisions have vaguely indicated that the defendant's prefer-
ence for death affects the scope of the attorney's responsibility without explaining
what this concretely means. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1386 (9' Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 208 (1997) ("Langford's insistence on pleading guilty and seek-
ing the death penalty is not utterly without effect on the determination of what Mac-
Kay as a competent attorney was required to do."); Jeffnes, 5 F.3d at 1197
(reasonableness inquiry is affected by defendant's acts and statements); Mltchell, 762
F.2d at 889-90 (same); Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324 (11" Cir. 1986) ("[A]
capital defendant's stated desire not to use character witnesses and refusal to testify
limits the scope of required investigation"); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1093-94 (5'-"
Cir. 1982). See also, Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281, 282 (5" Cir. 1987) (court need not
reach question of whether attorney who requested jury return death sentence based
on client wishes was ineffective).
46 This differs from cases involving insanity pleas, where imposition of pleas upon
unwilling defendants has prompted numerous appeals.
47 Such a defense challenges the prosecution's proof of the intent element of the
crime by arguing that the defendant was incapable of forming the intent required to
commit the offense. A successful mental health defense, often called a diminished
capacity defense, results in either acquittal (if the mental state was an essential ele-
ment of the crime) or reduction in the degree of the crime of conviction (when the
defense negates specific intent but a lesser included or related offense requires only
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ity prompted the United States Attorney in the Kaczynski case to
state, in its brief, "The government has found no case address-
ing the question whether counsel may rely on a mental defect
defense over the objection of a competent defendant."48 If a
mental health defense is treated as analogous to other affirma-
tive defenses, then the decision would appear to belong to the
attorney rather than to the defendant.49 This analogy may not
be the appropriate one, however; the prosecutors in the Kaczyn-
ski case suggested that the court instead follow cases addressing
a defendant's waiver of an insanity plea, and thereby allocate
the decision to the defendant. Similarities in the two contexts
support such an analogy: both implicate important dignitary
concerns and both may require a defendant to waive his Fifth
general intent). SeeJennifer Kunk Compton, Expert Witness Testimony and the Dimin-
ished Capacity Defense 20 AM.J. TRIALADVoc. 381, 382-84 (1996-97).
48Government's Motion for a Hearing, United States v. Theodore John Kaczynski,
No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 15074, at *3 (E.D. Cal.Jan. 15, 1998).
49Outside the mental health context (with which this article is concerned), most
courts which have considered situations involving an attorney's refusal to follow a de-
fendant's wishes and present a "merits-based" defense (in other words, a defense that
does not rely upon evidence of mental illness) have found that this does not render
representation defective. See United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1389-90 (91h Cir.
1996) (excessive force defense); United States v. Hansel, 70 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1995)
(statute of limitations defense); Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726-27 (8'h Cir. 1993)
(impotency defense); Capps v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260, 262 (10 'h Cir. 1990) (entrap-
ment defense); United States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1403-04 (10h Cir. 1988) (good
faith defense); United States ex rel. Barnard v. Lane, 819 F.2d 798, 802-05 (7'h Cir.
1987) (justification defense); Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (2d Cir. 1987)
(extreme emotional disturbance defense); Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 327-28 (6'h
Cir. 1984) (battered wife defense). When attorneys have acceded to defendant wishes
and failed to present meritorious defenses, courts have often expressly or implicitly
disapproved of such deference. See, e.g., Martin v. Maggio, 711 F.2d 1273, 1280 (5'h
Cir. 1983) (defendant's instruction to attorneys that they seek either a complete ac-
quittal or the death sentence did not justify failure to investigate intoxication de-
fense); DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578, 586-87 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct.
987 (1997) (finding attorneys ineffective for abandoning extreme emotional distur-
bance defense based on defendant's aversion to psychiatry, when attorney explained
defense inadequately); United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 712 (3d Cir. 1989) (attor-
ney should not have failed to subpoena witnesses based on defendant's reluctance).
But cf. Mulligan v. Kemp, 771 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11dh Cir. 1985) ("[f he is commanded
by his client to present a certain defense, and if he does thoroughly explain the po-
tential problems with the suggested approach, then his ultimate decision to follow the
client's will may not be lightly disturbed."); People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396, 405 (Cal.
1985) ("[W]hen a defendant insists on a course of action despite his counsel's con-
trary warning and advice, he may not later complain that his counsel provided inef-
fective assistance by complying with his wishes.").
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Amendment right and submit to a government psychiatric
exam.50 However, one important difference is that a mental
health defense will not result in indefinite commitment in a
psychiatric institution, eliminating one of the primary rational
objections to an insanity plea.5' Language in reported decisions
can be found to support either the position that the decision be-
longs to the defendant or to defense counsel.52
50Admissions that a defendant makes in a compulsory exam by government psy-
chiatric experts may be used against him in trial, including factual admissions about
the crime itself. This is true in cases in which the defendant raises an insanity de-
fense, see Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 684 (1989) (per curiam), or diminished ca-
pacity, see Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422-24 (1987). See also Soria v. State,
933 S.W.2d 46, 57-59 (Tex. Grim. App. 1996) (reaching same conclusion when de-
fendant sought to introduce psychiatric testimony on future dangerousness in capital
sentencing phase). In contrast, submission to a court-ordered competency examina-
tion does not waive the Fifth Amendment right. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,
465-66, 469 (1981). Cf Hendricks v. People, 10 P. 3d 1231, 1241-42 (Colo. 2000) (en
banc) (reasoning that, when court orders psychiatric examination to determine
whether insanity defense should be imposed, privileges and right against self-
incrimination are not waived).
51 See 18 U.S.C. § 4243 (1999) (governing commitment of individuals adjudicated
not guilty by reason of insanity). See also Gordon Witkin, Wh71at Does It Take to Be Craz'?,
U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Jan. 12, 1998, at 7 (pointing out that those found insane
will often spend more time involuntarily institutionalized than they would have been
imprisoned for following conviction of the crime); David R. Katner, Raising the Insan-
ity Plea, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE L.w.",n.R, 1995 A.B.A
SECrION. CRimNAiL J. 55 (concluding that courts allow defendants exclusive control
over whether to raise an insanity defense because it results in indefinite commitment
in a mental institution, distinguishing it from all other affirmative defenses).
52 Compare Dean v. Superintendent, 93 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1996) ("It clearly is
preferable for counsel to leave the decision whether ... to reject a legal defense to
the client") with United States v. Layton, 666 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(characterizing attorneys as having taken defendants opposition to mental health de-
fense into account, "although they recognized that the decision was ultimately theirs
and not his"). See also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, J., concur-
ring) (the lawyer, "not the client, has the immediate-and-ultimate responsibility of
deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to
develop."). Two state supreme courts have explicitly ruled on the issue. One held
that a defendant had the right to waive a diminished capacity defense based on his
desire to avoid the accompanying stigma, even though it characterized the decision as
"legally imprudent." See State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 670 (Utah 1997). The
other expressly approved an attorney's decision to override the defendant's desire to
deny any involvement in the crime and present a mental health defense. See People v.
Jones, 811 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1991). See also People v. Anderson, 641 N.E.2d 591, 599-600
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (whether to raise mental health defense is attorney's decision be-
cause it does not require entry of formal plea and is therefore a matter of trial strat-
egy).
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2. Ethical Canons
The ethical canons, in attempting to defer to a client's
autonomy but at the same time hold an attorney responsible for
pursuing her client's best interests, provide little guidance to at-
torneys facing this dilemma. It is conventionally stated that cli-
ents decide the objectives of representation and attorneys, in
consultation with clients, make strategic and tactical decisions
designed to facilitate the objectives of their clients.53 Decisions
clearly reserved for a client include the "plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
4
Decisions traditionally allocated to the authority of defense
counsel include "what witnesses to call, whether and how to
conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what
trial motions should be made, and what evidence should be in-
troduced.""'
The distinction between objectives and means, however, is
not as coherent as it might initially appear, and many decisions
can be easily characterized both as strategic ones regarding
means and as fundamental ones regarding objectives.56 The de-
cisions addressed by this article offer a perfect example of the
difficulty of such a method of categorization: the decision
whether to present evidence of mental illness and/or assert a
53See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.2 (a) (1996). See also WAYNE
R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.6(a), at 557 (2d ed. 1992).
54MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.2(a) (1996); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIMY EC 7-7 (1983). See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
751, 753 n.6 (1983) (affirming that the Constitution requires that decisions whether
to plead guilty, waive ajury trial, testify, and appeal belong to individual defendants).
55ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJusT'rtE 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993). See also JOHN M.
BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAw & LiABILITY § 6.3(a)(2), at 6-25, 26 (1997);
LaFave & Israel, supra note 53, at § 11.6(a), at 559.
56See LaFave & Israel, supra note 53, at § 11.6(b), at 560 (2d ed. 1992); RodneyJ.
Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and
Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L.
REv. 1, 14-15 (1998). Of course, "[a] clear distinction between objectives and means
sometimes cannot be drawn." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt.
(2000). The Model Code's Ethical Considerations make a similar distinction between
ends and means: "In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of
the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to
make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclu-
sively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions




mental health defense can be characterized as a strategic deci-
sion regarding the optimal means to defend a case, but in most
cases such a decision also fundamentally implicates the client's
objectives and personal dignity.
Given this close relation between (attorney) strategy and
(client) objectives, the ethical authorities are not definitive.
While the Model Code's Ethical Considerations suggest that a
decision to waive an affirmative defense or to foregoresentation
of relevant evidence must be made by the client,' the Model
Rules contrarily instruct that "a lawyer is not required to pursue
objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish
that the lawyer do so., 51s Moreover, the ethical authorities fail to
locate the authority to decide to assert a defense or present rele-
vant evidence when the client objects to the lawyer doing so."
Perhaps the strongest support for locating this decision with the
defendant is found in the language of Ethical Consideration 7-8:
"the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client
and not for [the lawyer]." Under these guidelines, it would
appear that a defendant who seeks to preserve her dignity by re-
fusing to present evidence of mental illness, who prefers a
prison sentence to indefinite psychiatric institutionalization, or
who would rather die than spend life in prison, has the right to
instruct her attorney to respect her wishes.
The Ethical Considerations, however, also instruct an attor-
ney to "act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his
client."6 Furthermore, most ethical authorities grant attorneys
additional decision-making authority when a client's compe-
tency is in question, although the scope of this authority is far
57See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLIr EC 7-7, 7-26. But see MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrnYDR 7-101 (B) (1) (1980) ("Where permissible, [a
lawyer may] exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or po-
sition of his client").
5 8 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2 cmL. (1989).
59For discussion of the gap in the rules, see Uphoff & Wood, supra note 56, at 12-
13. Similarly, the ethical rules place more emphasis on the requirement of consulta-
tion with a client when a lawyer is waiving a right that belongs to the client; the need
for such consultation when a lawyer asserts a right or defense, on the other hand, is
far less clearly articulated. See Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 59-60.
60 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980).
61 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmLTY EC 7-9 (1980).
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from clear and an attorney must, "as far as reasonably possible,




No specific guidance is provided as to whether an attorney may
raise a mental health defense or insanity plea over a client's ob-
jection when the attorney believes that the client's objection is
the product of his mental illness.63 Similarly, when a defendant
in a capital case decides that he would prefer a death sentence
to life in prison, and accordingly instructs his attorney not to
present any mitigating evidence, it is not clear what an attor-
ney's ethical responsibility requires.6 Whether or not to present
mitigating evidence is not primarily a question of what strategies
to employ, but whether the objective should be to obtain or
avoid a death sentence: "to introduce evidence supportive of life
imprisonment when the defendant's objective is death is not a
tactical decision. Mitigation evidence is in direct abrogation of
the defendant's objective in the case."65 Ultimate objectives are
supposed to be determined by the defendant.65
62MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RuLE 1.14(a) (1996). See also MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT RULE 1.14 cmt. (1996).
63 But see Katner, supra note 51, at 50 (concluding that the consensus of ethical
authorities is that an attorney may not raise an insanity plea over a client's objection).
64 Defendants often express such a desire for the death sentence after they have
been found guilty and before the penalty phase, at a point when defendants often
view an early death as more attractive than the alternative immediately ahead. See
Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1380 (1988).
Many defendants make similar decisions after spending some time on death row, and
ask their attorneys to drop all appeals. Approximately 10% of executions involve de-
fendants who have made such decisions. See Matthew T. Norman, Standards and Pro-
cedures for Determining Whether a Defendant Is Competent to Make the Ultimate Choice -
Death; Ohio 's New Precedent for Death Row "Volunteers," 13J.L. & HEALTH 103, 106 (1998-
99); Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299 (1983). While an in-depth discussion of the issue of
whether individuals facing execution should be allowed to waive their right to appeal
is beyond the scope of this article, it certainly raises some analogous concerns. Courts
have generally allowed defendants to waive appeals unless a state statute makes the
appeal mandatory. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014-15 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
65 Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-
Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55
TENN. L. REV. 95, 146 (1987).
66 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the ethical authorities leave defense counsel with little
guidance when representing a defendant who insists that coun-
sel present no evidence of mental health problems, when such
problems are highly relevant to the guilt or sentencing deter-
mination: "No ethical code or rule dictates which course a
criminal defense attorney must take when a client, her judg-
ment apparently clouded by mental illness, resists following
counsel's advice."67
D. THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT BETWEEN MENTALLY ILL
DEFENDANTS AND COUNSEL
The attorney-client relationship in a criminal case is inher-
ently problematic. Most often, the relationship is established
under the emotionally intense circumstances following an arrest
and arraignment (which includes advising the defendant of the
maximum sentence contemplated by the law). Much more of-
ten than not, counsel must bring bad news-the weight of the
evidence or the possible sentence, for example-that clients and
their families are loathe to hear. Court-appointed counsel, in
particular, must perform these functions not having been cho-
sen by the client and, therefore, facing a trust barrier often
compounded by socio-economic and racial factors.'8 These ten-
sions create the potential for conflict over control of the de-
fense and, as discussed above, the existence of the Faretta right
endows clients with the power to veto or appropriate important
decisions, including the decision to present evidence of their
mental illness.
A growing number of criminal defendants suffer from some
form of mental illness.69 The fact of mental illness complicates
67 Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Clients Best Interests: The Defense Lauyer's Di-
lemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRLI. L RE%. 1343,
1345 (1998). See also Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense
Lawyer's Fiduciay Duty to Clients With MentalDisability, 68 FORDHAm L RE%. 1581, 1610-
14 (2000) (discussing failure of ABA ethical authorities to provide clarity).
6S See Robert Miller & Leonard Kaplan, Representation by Counsel. Right or Obhga-
tion, 10 BEHAVORAL SC. & LAW, 401-403 (1992) (reporting widespread dissatisfaction
with counsel among sample of indigent defendants ).
A recent study by the United States Department of Justice concluded that in
1998 there were 283,800 individuals suffering from some form of mental illness in
prison or jail and 547,800 such people had been placed on probation. Michael J.
Sniffen, Many Mentally Ill AmericansJaied, AP ONLINEJul. 12, 1999. This represented
16% of state prison inmates, local jail inmates and probationers. and 7% of federal
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the attorney-client negotiation over control of the defense and,
in the context of representation of mentally ill persons, the post-
Faretta negotiation becomes particularly fragile for two reasons.
First, mental illness often creates difficulties in communication.
Second, mental illness often affects a client's valuation of objec-
tives and evaluation of strategy. Frequently, the attorney-client
negotiation in this context takes on great urgency over counsel's
recommendation of a defense based on mental illness and, of-
ten, insistence on such a defense results in a breakdown of the
attorney-client relationship.70
Mental health defenses, to add to the paradox, are often
opposed by mentally ill clients precisely as a consequence of
their mental illness.7 In this connection, it is important to rec-
ognize that a mentally ill person might rationally fear the con-
sequences of an insanity plea and wisely choose to risk a
criminal conviction with a statutory maximum term of incar-
ceration over indefinite "civil" commitment.72  Quite often,
prisoners. See id. The same study estimated that four out of ten received no treat-
ment while incarcerated. See id. See also Clarke Thomas, Editorial, PITr. POST-
GAZETTE, Oct. 13, 1999, at A19 (reporting that American Jail Association estimates
that 600,000 to 700,000 mentally ill individuals are booked into jails in the United
States every year).
70Many mentally disabled criminal defendants have dual diagnoses: that is, they
suffer from both a mental illness and a substance addiction. The frequency of sub-
stance addiction further complicates the attorney-client relationship because that re-
lationship often commences just as the client begins the painful process of
withdrawal.
71 According to the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, approximately half of
individuals afflicted with schizophrenia do not believe in their own mental disability
or need for treatment. Laurie M. Flynn, No Death Penalty for Persons with Severe Mental
Illnesses, PR NwswIvRE WASH. DATEuNE, Jan. 12, 1998. One study of criminal defen-
dants diagnosed with serious major mental disabilities reported that 10% opposed en-
tering an insanity plea and an additional 15% "were unreceptive to the attribution of
mental illness." See Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 54. Of course, an aversion to being
portrayed as insane is of course also consistent with mental health, as many sane indi-
viduals would not welcome the stigma of being designated schizophrenic. Telephone
Interview with Ron Kuby (Apr. 23, 1998). A survey of twenty-five defendants who had
refused insanity defenses found that ten did not believe they were mentally ill, six as-
serted their innocence, eight feared hospitalization or longer incarceration, and one
wanted to "get it over with." Miller et al., supra note 33, at 501-02. The evaluators
noted that "the majority of those claiming they were innocent did so in a way that
contradicted significant physical evidence, often in bizarre way," but that the remain-
der appeared to be competent decisions. Id.
72 For a discussion of some of these rational reasons, see infra notes 86-90 and ac-
companying text.
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however, mentally ill criminal defendants reject mental health
defenses for reasons directly related to their disability: for ex-
ample, a mentally ill person might not perceive the illness itself
or its legal significance (the potential for non-responsibility due
to lack of criminal intent). She might also elect self representa-
tion in order to "make a more glorious kind of defense"73 such
as self defense or simply not having committed the acts charged,
or she might insist that she is innocent out of honest belief, de-
spite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.7' In choosing the
path of glory, mentally ill defendants often forego the presenta-
tion of existing (or readily available) relevant evidence of men-
tal illness. In such cases, the trier-of-fact will determine guilt
and/or set punishment deprived of essential evidence relating
to intent. The right to self representation, then, effectively ex-
cludes relevant evidence of mental illness from the fact-finding
process.
In practice, the phenomena described above confuse the
operation of the criminal justice process, inject a destructive
element of gamesmanship into the attorney-client relationship,
erode the integrity of the criminal process, and, ultimately, un-
dermine public respect for the criminal justice system. The ul-
timate reality-the potential for self representation by an
unstable person-is also unfair, in a profound sense, to an indi-
vidual whose mental illness may have contributed not only to
her actions, but may also contribute to her self immolation
through self representation in the criminal process. In these
cases, the jury never learns of her mental illness and therefore
convicts and/or selects a sentence ignorant of her basic human
qualities.
The result of this combination-uncertainty in legal and
ethical norms and the grant of an absolute right to represent
oneself-was disastrous in the Ferguson and Kaczynski murder
cases and leads to similarly troubling results in many other cases
involving mentally ill defendants. First, these norms operate,
like Malthusian scissors, to create a significant class of "compe-
tent" but mentally ill individuals who elect to represent them-
selves at trial. This effect occurs because the low competency
73 United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt. J.. con-
curring) (quoting defendant's statement in transcript of pretrial hearing), cert. denied.
120 S. Ct. 1428 (2000).
74See Miller et al., supra note 33, at 501-02; Ross, sup-a note 67, at 1348-49.
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standard often confuses a mentally-disturbed criminal defen-
dant with her mentally stable counterparts and the Faretta right
gives her the same right to represent herself as it would a stable
defendant. '5 Second, and equally as important, a defendant's
ultimate recourse to the right of self representation-even that of
a mentally unstable defendant-curbs counsel's decision-making
authority by creating the potential, in each important attorney-
client disagreement, that the client will terminate the relation-
ship.76 Mentally ill defendants, in fact, often threaten self repre-
sentation in the face of counsel's recommendation to present
mental health evidence. Paradoxically, then, the Faretta right
becomes, in the hands of mentally ill defendants, an instrument
for preventing the presentation of relevant evidence of mental
illness and a defense (often the best defense) based upon such
evidence whether or not the right is formally asserted. Faretta,
then, distorts the truth-finding function of the criminal justice
by empowering mentally ill criminal defendants to foreclose
presentation of evidence highly relevant to criminal intent and
culpability.
II. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO ALLOCATING AUTHORITY
WITHIN THE ArTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: BALANCING
AUTONOMY AND BEST INTERESTS
As discussed above, case law and ethical canons provide
more confusion than guidance to attorneys, courts, and clients
facing conflicts over allocation of authority between client and
counsel. This confusion results from the narrow focus that
courts and scholars have adopted in analyzing the allocation of
authority within the attorney-client relationship. Traditionally,
courts and scholars have approached the conflict as pitting a de-
fendant's personal autonomy (including "dignity" interests)
against the client's best interests. Such an approach neglects
the commitment that we as a society have pledged to justice.
75 See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
76 In theory, a similar effect may follow from a client's right to fire her counsel,
which also exerts pressure on an attorney to respect a client's wishes. In reality, the
right of self representation undermines the attorney-client relationship much more
directly because a pro se criminal defendant has direct control over all defense deci-
sions. In contrast, a criminal defendant who seeks new counsel (particularly ap-
pointed counsel) is by no means assured that (1) she will be appointed new counsel
or (2) the decisions by new counsel will coincide with her preferences.
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This section of the paper assesses the values underlying the
traditional approach to allocating authority within the attorney-
client relationship. This discussion is intended to emphasize
the philosophical limitations of the autonomy/best interests di-
chotomy. We suggest that a commitment to individual rights
should not obscure the importance of societal interests that of-
ten serve to protect us all from erosion of important commit-
ments. It is from this perspective that we now turn to the two
values that have thus far dominated the allocation of authority
within the attorney-client relationship: autonomy and best in-
terests.
A. THE AUTONOMY ARGUMENT
The autonomy viewpoint treats questions involving the
presentation of a defense as implicating the objectives of repre-
sentation and therefore properly belonging to the criminal de-
fendant.] Underlying the autonomy viewpoint is the notion
that attorneys will not make better decisions than clients be-
cause they often do not fully understand a client's interests and
needs, especially when there are maior social, economic, or cul-
tural differences between the two. The autonomy viewpoint
suggests that allowing a client control of decisions will produce
decisions that better meet client needs and affirm a client's
sense of personhood and individuality.'
n7See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) ("The defendant, and not his
lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction .... And al-
though he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice
must be honored.").
78See Marcy Strauss, Toward a Reuised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argu-
mentfor Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 328-29 (1987).
79See id. at 336-38. A variant of the autonomy point has been expressed in philo-
sophical terms as "the right to be punished." This theory proposes that the right to
be treated as a person, which is enjoyed by all individuals, carries with it the right to
have one's choices respected and to choose punishment as the consequence of com-
mitting criminal offenses. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNx sIt'T
AND REHABLITATION 40 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed. 1973); Martin R. Gardner, The Right to
Be Punished-A Suggested Constitutional Thay, 33 RuTGERs L REv. 838 (1981). For re-
cent debates over the significance of this right for theories of punishment, see R.A.
Duff, In Defence of One Type of Retributivism, 24 MELB. U. I- RE,. 411, 417-18 (2000);
Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The E=rs of RetributiuiiSn, 24 MELB. U. L REV.
124, 174-175 (2000); Robert L Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 W&. & MAr" L RE%.
1303, 1349-53 (2000); Robert D. Miller, Forced Administration of Sex-Drive Redueng
Medications to Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punishment? 4 PS'VCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L 175,
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The strongest expression of the autonomy interest in mod-
em jurisprudence, and the expression of greatest (im)practical
import, is Faretta v. California, which recognized a nearly abso-
lute right of self representation, formally based in the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel but ef-
fectively rooted in the principle of individual autonomy: "that
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law."8 In
an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court reasoned
that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a
defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused
personally the right to make his defense."' r- The Faretta majority
recognized that self representation would injure the interests of
most criminal defendants, and expressly held that defendants
who opt to represent themselves waive any right to bring inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims based on their own trial per-
187-88 (1998). It has been suggested that recognition of such a right precludes the
involuntary imposition of the insanity defense. See Gardner, supra, at 861. However,
proponents of this theory have recognized that this right may be limited or post-
poned in cases in which mental illness inhibits the ability to make rational choices.
See, e.g., id. at 839 & n.13, 856 nn.92-93. Gardner also proposes that the right to be
punished does not encompass the right to choose a particular punishment (especially
one that itself denies an individual's personhood), and therefore does not give indi-
viduals the right to be put to death or forego capital appeals. See id. at 862-63.
80 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970)
(Brennan,J., concurring)). According to a later opinion by Justice Brennan, the ra-
tionale of Faretta rested on "the view that the ... Sixth Amendment is to protect the
dignity and autonomy of a person on trial by assisting him in making choices that are
his to make, not to make choices for him." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that Faretta's recognition of an in-
terest in autonomy required that defendants have the right to insist on certain argu-
ments in trial; only those decisions that had to be made quickly in the course of a trial
were exclusively the province of the attorney. See id. at 759-60.
The Faretta decision was also based on an analysis of the historical recognition of a
right of self representation. The Supreme Court's recent decision rejecting a right to
self representation on appeal dismissed such evidence as unreliable because of the
historical absence of a corresponding right to assistance of counsel:
Thus, a government's recognition of an indigent defendant's right to represent him-
self was comparable to bestowing upon the homeless beggar a "right" to take shelter in the
sewers of Paris. Not surprisingly, early precedent demonstrates that this "fight" was not al-
ways used to the defendant's advantage as a shield, but rather was often employed by the
prosecution as a sword.
Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 157 (2000).
81 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.
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formance.82 Thus, under Faretta, autonomy is the favored value
regardless of whether it is exercised in a manner that actually
serves the defendant's best interests.
An approach to representation that places maximization of
a client's autonomy at the forefront of the lawyer's objectives is
popular among legal academics who believe in radical lawyering
or lawyering for social change.Y Most of these individuals pri-
marily discuss legal representation in the civil context. How-
ever, their ideas about the power dynamics inherent in an
attorney-client relationship and the importance of self- deter-
mination in the context of this relationship extend to the
criminal defense realm. Practitioners and commentators who
favored the autonomy viewpoint were extremely active in the
debate accompanying Kaczynski's trial. In a widely reprinted ar-
ticle that argued that Kaczynski's lawyers had improperly dic-
tated the objectives of representation, legal ethics professor
Richard Zitrin asked, "[w]ho in the courtroom spoke for what
Ted Kaczynski wanted? ... [I] t was Kaczynski's life at stake, and
his call to make. As members of the criminal law community of-
ten say, 'We don't do the time."'8 4 Tony Serra, who entered the
fray by offering to represent Kaczynski on his own terms, justi-
fied his position on the ground that "[a] person has the right to
82See id. at 834 & n.46 (acknowledging that defendant "may conduct his own de-
fense ultimately to his own detriment.").
83See generally DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, PH.D, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-
Centered Counseling. Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 AR. L RE%. 501 (1990); Stephen
Ellmann, Laugjers and Clients, 34 UCLA L RE%,. 717 (1987); Mark Spiegel, Lauermng
and Client Decision Making Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L REV.
41 (1979); Strauss, supra note 78, at 321-22. In the civil context, values such as self-
determination and empowerment play an even more central role, since many lavyers
view their roles as assisting or facilitating community organization and mobilization.
See generally GERALD P. LOPEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION 'OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACnrCE (1992); Daniel S. Shah, Lauy'eringfor Empowerment: Com-
munityDevelopment and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. RE%,. 217 (1999). For discussion of
the use of the client-centered model in the criminal defense context, see Kim Taylor-
Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public De-
fender, 84 GEO. I.J. 2419, 2440 (1996); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effec-
tiveAssistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L RE%. 841 (1998).
84Richard A. Zitrin, The Kaczynski Dilemma, N.J. L.J., Feb. 9, 1998, at 24.
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defend himself in the manner he chooses, even if it means
death, as long as he appreciates the risk."85
Advocates of the autonomy viewpoint emphasize that a deci-
sion to forego an insanity plea, mental health defense, or pres-
entation of mitigating circumstances may be an entirely rational
course of action based on practical, dignitary, or even political
concerns. An insanity plea or mental health defense may un-
dermine the legitimacy of the defendant's motives,86 admit guilt
of the offense charged,87 result in indefinite commitment in a
mental institution and unwanted psychiatric treatment,ss carry
85 Finnegan, supra note 2, at 56 (quoting Tony Serra). For a recent article propos-
ing that Kaczynski should have been allowed to control his own defense, see Joel S.
Newman, Doctors, Lawyers and the Unabomber, 60 MoNT. L. REv. 67 (1999). After re-
viewing the legal and ethical authorities, Newman concludes that the decision at issue
concerned ultimate objectives rather than tactics or means and therefore belonged to
a competent defendant. See id. at 90, 96-100.
Another recent article reaches the similar conclusion that attorneys should control
the tactical and strategic decisions that arise in criminal defense except that a defen-
dant should control the basic theory of the defense including the decision whether to
plead insanity or raise a mental health defense. See H. Richard Ulviller, Calling the
Shots: The Allocation of Choice Between the Accused and Counsel in the Defense of a Criminal
Case, 52 RurGERs L. REv. 719 (2000). Ulviller makes an exception to his grant of
authority to the defendant when the lawyer is ethically unable to advance the theory
of defense that the client prefers. See id. at 771. The authors of the instant article,
however, focus not on cases in which the attorney has ethical difficulties taking a posi-
tion, but with cases in which we believe it unethical to fail to present important evi-
dence or argument.
86 See United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1974), overruled by
United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Frendak v. United States, 408
A.2d 364, 377 (D.C. 1979); State v.Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Wash. 1983). This
was, of course, of particular concern to Kaczynski, whose journals expressed a strong
fear that he would be portrayed as a "sickie" in order to undermine and invalidate his
political views. See Evelyn Cruz, KaczynsiJournal Entry: I'm No "Sickie, "S.F. EXAM., Nov.
20, 1997, at Al; Dr. SallyJohnson, supra note 2.
87 See Frendak, 408 A.2d at 377.
88See United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing the
defendant's rational preference for a fixed jail sentence rather than indefinite com-
mitment in a mental institution known for its poor conditions), overruled by United
States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991); People v. Redmond, 94 Cal. Rptr.
543, 545-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (defendant preferred sentence of at most six months
in jail to indefinite commitment in mental hospital); Frendak, 408 A.2d at 376 (noting
that defendants might "object to the quality of treatment or the type of confinement"
available in a mental institution as well as to the possibility of longer confinement);
State v. Johnston, 527 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Wash. 1974) (defendant may prefer incar-
ceration to institutionalization).
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tremendous societal stigma,9 and in some cases be strategically
unwise. 9° Thus, it is clear that there are important dignitary in-
terests, as well as practical interests, offended by the argument
that one's actions were the product of one's insanity.9' Courts
have recognized a similar interest in autonomy in death penalty
cases.9' Reasons other than a preference for death, such as a de-
sire to spare one's family members the agony of testifying, might
cause a defendant to want to thwart presentation of mitigating
evidence.3 Furthermore, some courts have even recognized as
valid interests the dignitary justifications for seeking a death
sentence:
The decision to ask for the death sentence was based on his ra-
tional and understandable decision that he would rather die than spend
the rest of his life in jail as a crippled and badly injured man.... This
89SeeFrendak 408 A.2d at 377. In fact, the stigma of being a former mental patient
may be worse than that which results from an adjudication of guilt of a crime. See
Miller et al., supra note 33, at 488-89 (citing HJ. STEADMAN &J. COCOZ.A, CAPURS OF
TH CRmALLY INsANE (1974)).
90See generally Right and Responsibility, supra note 26, at 945-46; Katner. supra note
51, at 55.
91 For this reason, one defendant preferred to rely on an alibi rather than an in-
sanity defense despite the likelihood of a life sentence, because "at least that leaves a
man, if there is any peace of mind in a case like this, with that little bit left." People v.
Gauze, 542 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Cal. 1975) (quoting defendant). See also People v.
Deere, 710 P.2d 925, 929 (Deere 1) (Cal. 1985). The intensely personal nature of the
decision to plead insanity may accentuate the importance of this interest in personal
autonomy. In Treece v. State, the court explained that choices with "important per-
sonal consequences" are generally reserved for the individual defendant to make, and
concluded that the results of a successful insanity defense are sufficienty "grave and
personal" to give this decision to the defendant. Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054, 1058-
60 (Md. 1988).
92See Bonnie, supra note 64, at 1390 ("[T]he prevailing view seems to be that the
decision of a competent defendant to forgo a (presumably meritorious) insanity de-
fense should be honored. The defendant's dignity supersedes the dignity of the law
in this [death sentence] context as well."). See also Dere I, 710 P.2d at 936 (Lucas, J.
concurring and dissenting) (characterizing the majority decision to overturn a death
sentence when the defendant blocked presentation of mitigating evidence as "patron-
izing" and intruding on the privacy and dignity rights of the defendant). For a deci-
sion explicitly comparing the insanity defense and death penalty decisions, see People
v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 714-15 (Cal. 1989).
93See Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 749-50 (11' Cir. 1988) (defendant did not
want mother to testify on personal information about father's sexual abuse of sib-
lings); LaRette v. State, 703 SAW.2d 37, 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (defendant did not
want father to testify because of concerns about father's health).
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court does not credit the expert witnesses who testified that Felde made
his decision to seek the death penalty out of a self-destructiveness
brought about by his post-traumatic stress disorder.. . . Far from the
choice of a suicidal incompetent, Felde showed the depth of his feelings
and cognition in putting up such a defense.94
Even when a defendant's desire to block consideration of
evidence of mental illness appears to be motivated by entirely ir-
rational concerns, many autonomy proponents would object
that respect for autonomy demands deference to such a
choice." For there is another concern that underlies the argu-
ments of those who favor the defendant's autonomy interests:
autonomy proponents, many of whom built their reputations
representing defendants who chose to present political defenses
to criminal offenses, object that determining whether a view-
point amounts to mental illness or to a fringe political ideology
is a value judgment that is inappropriate for defense counsel or
the court to make. In autonomy proponents' view, an individ-
ual who chooses to martyr himself on behalf a cause should
94 Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281, 282-83 (5" Cir. 1987) (quoting trial court deci-
sion). See also Bloom, 774 P.2d at 715 n.7 (arguing that life imprisonment can be as
bad as a death sentence). Defense attorneys have often justified their complicity with
a defendant's quest for a death sentence on dignitary grounds. The defense attorney
whose actions were at issue in Deere expressed this concern eloquently: "[Ilf I were to
follow the Court's order and present mitigating evidence... (my client] would object
to the very depth of his soul," and it would violate the client's "true and sincere and
honest beliefs about what is right for him." People v. Deere (DeerefI), 808 P.2d 1181,
1187 (Cal. 1991). See also Felde, 817 F.2d 281, at 284 ("I can't tell anyone to take
someone else's life but I think ... only the person whose life is to be taken has that
right."); Deere I, 710 P.2d at 929 ("I have no right whatsoever to infringe upon his de-
cisions about his own life.") (alteration in original).
Assertions that a desire to die can be rational can also be found in cases regarding
death penalty appeals:
The idea that the deliberate decision of one under sentence of death to abandon possible
additional legal avenues of attack on that sentence cannot be a rational decision, regardless
of its motive, suggests that the preservation of one's own life at whatever cost is the summum
bonunz a proposition with respect to which the greatest philosophers and theologians have
not agreed.....
Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312-13 (1979).
95 See David S. Cohn, Offensive Use of the Insanity Defense: Imposing the Insanity Defense
over the Defendant's Objection, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 313-14 (1988)("[T] he
search for truth, though primary, does not subordinate all other interests.. . . [T]he
larger interest in an individual's autonomy and freedom of choice must take prece-
dence over the purported interest in refusing to punish the mentally ill.").
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have the right "to lose to make a point."* These individuals
frame the right to refuse to assert "the best defense" as an im-
portant element in the tradition of civil disobedience and po-
litical dissent:
A defendant has, and should have, the right to reject a defense that
runs contrary to a deeply held ethical, religious, or political viewpoints.
From the narrow perspective of the criminal defense lawyer, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. would have had a stronger legal argument pleading in-
sanity rather than arguing that his civil disobedience w,,asjustified. Simi-
larly, the "best" defense was not forwarded by the young people who
burned the American flag atop of the Times Square recruiting station to
protest the Gulf War.. . . Even Jesus would have been better off to have
pleaded diminished capacity based on excessive exposure to the desert
sun than to remark "thou hast said it" when asked if he was the Son ofGod. 97
In an article that appeared a few months after Kaczynski's
guilty plea, The New Yorker columnist William Finnegan argued
that it is difficult to distinguish political dissent from mental ill-
ness and objected to the imposition of "the ideology of the psy-
9
6 Professor Richard Bourne, University of Baltimore, quoted in Sandy Banisky, Kac-
zynski: AFool for a Client?, BALT. SUN,Jan. 8, 1998, atA2.
97 Ruby and Kunstler, supra note 1, at 23. One defense attorney respondcd to
Kuby's analogy: "if I was representingJesus Christ, don't you know that I woulda tried
to win that case? And that's what we do as criminal defense lawyers." Rivera Live
(CNBC News Transcript, Jan. 20, 1998) (statement of David Dratraan, criminal de-
fense attorney).
Kuby has also compared the imposition of insanity defenses upon defendants who
preferred to assert a political defense for their actions to practices in the former So-
viet Union that labeled all political dissidents mentally ill. Riera Lve, supra (state-
ment of Ronald Kuby); All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast transcript, Jan.
6, 1998) (statement of Ronald Kuby). See also Sandy Banisky, Kac:-nskz: A Fool for a
Client?, BALT. SUN, Jan. 8, 1998, at A2 (quoting Richard Bourne, law professor, Uni-
versity of Baltimore) (arguing that individuals who choose to martyr themselves on
behalf of a cause they believe in should be allowed "to lose to make a point.").
In fact, it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish political dissent from mental
disability, and "the ideology of the psychiatrist" may come into play to classify legiti-
mate political ideas as mental disability. Finnegan, supra note 2, at 54. Tony Serra.
the attorney chosen by Kaczynski to replace Clarke and Denvir, planned to argue an
imperfect necessity defense based on Kaczynski's perception of the threat of technol-
ogy-and maintained about this perception, "It's not crazy, and it's not difficult to un-
derstand. And if the hole in the ozone opens and kills us all, he'll be proved right!"
Id. at 56. Another case in which mental illness appeared to interact with genuine po-
litical ideology was that of John Salvi, who was found competent to stand trial and
convicted of murdering two individuals who worked in abortion clinics. Salvi ulti-
mately committed suicide in prison. Ross, supra note 67, at 1347 n.18.
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chiatrist" to classify legitimate political ideas as mental illnessY8
More recently, longtime capital defense attorney Michael Mello,
who now distinguishes himself from what he characterizes as a
paternalistic capital defense bar, has published a book compar-
ing Kaczynski to abolitionist John Brown. He proposes that the
psychiatrists and lawyers who interpreted Kaczynski's radical po-
litical ideology as symptomatic of mental illness stifled Kaczyn-
ski's right to use his criminal trial to make a statement about the
dangers of technology.99 For these reasons, autonomy propo-
nents argue that decisions regarding presentation of an insanity
plea or other mental health defense may only be made by a de-
fendant.
While we share many of the views of this school of thought
in cases involving criminal defendants that are not mentally im-
paired, the autonomy viewpoint fails to account for the fact that
mental illness itself may render an individual's decisions unfree.
This is one of the primary critiques that the "best interests"
school of thought, to which we now turn, has of the autonomy
theorists.
B. THE BEST INTERESTS ARGUMENT
Those who reject the proposition that a defendant has the
absolute right to control his defense rely upon the notion that
an attorney's obligation is not to assist a client's articulation of
her desires and objectives, but rather to act in her client's best
interests. In particular, the stakes in capital cases have moti-
vated attorneys to conclude that their sense of morality and re-
sponsibility prevents them from uniformly respecting client
wishes. Welsh S. White, who spoke to a number of capital de-
fense attorneys in researching this issue, reported that while
many acknowledged the importance of client autonomy to
make decisions,
98Finnegan, supra note 2, at 54. James Q. Wilson maintained that Kaczynski's
Manifesto was well argued and rational, claiming, "If it is the work of a madman, then
the writings of many political philosophers-Jean Jacques Rousseau, Tom Paine, Karl
Marx-are scarcely more sane." Id. at 61 (quotingJames Q. Wilson). For another ex-
ample of a defendant who felt this way, see United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148,
1158 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (insanity defense "would impugn the credibility of his racial
and political views."), overruled by United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
99MELLo, supra note 2.
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[N]ot one indicated that he could imagine a case in which he would
voluntarily allow a capital defendant to submit to execution. Thus, for
these attorneys, the bottom line is that the goal of preventing the gov-
ernment from killing a human being outweighs a defense attorney's
normal obligation to respect his client's autonomy.
Many legal commentators and practitioners who advocate a
paternalistic approach to client representation do so in part
based on the view that most criminal defendants do not fully
understand the legal process, even if they have had multiple ex-
periences in the criminal justice system.'0
The best interests argument is particularly compelling in
cases involving mentally ill defendants, whose "autonomy" may
be illusory if mental illness prevents them from making free, ra-
tional decisions. In the case of a mentally ill defendant, best in-
terests advocates argue, "the free will presupposed by our
criminal justice system cannot be presumed." c Instead, a rec-
ognition of the unique vulnerability of a mentally ill defendant
may require attorneys to play a paternalistic role and override
the preferences expressed by the defendant."0 The low stan-
dard of mental health required by the competency determina-
tion supports the argument that mentally ill defendants are
often not making free and voluntary decisions.'04 In fact, the de-
100 Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execulion, 48 U. PITr. L RE. 853, 861
(1987).
101 See Strauss, supra note 78, at 321-22 (1987). The argument that an attorney will
make better decisions than a client generally rests on the attorney's "superior techni-
cal and tactical knowledge." Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Instiutional
Player Alternating V-tsions of the Public Defender, 84 GEo. Lj. 2419, 2440 (1996).
102United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
103 See Shull v. South Carolina, 1989 INL 106842 at *8 (4'' Cir. Sept. 5, 1989) (Ervin,
J., dissenting) (pointing to decisions allowing imposition of a psychiatric examination
on possibly incompetent clients as demonstrating the uniqueness of the attorney rela-
tionship with mentally ill clients).
104Examples from reported cases make this point, as well. Se State v. Smith, 564
P.2d 1154, 1156 (Wash. 1977) (defendant wanted to present self defense claim that
fellow train passenger invaded his privacy through the use of ESP and attempted to
kidnap him by turning the train around); State v. Khan, 417 A.2d 585, 591 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (defendant insisted on self defense claim although it w-as
based on "paranoiac delusion"). For another example of such twisted reasoning, but
one where the defendant successfully resisted his attorney's advice to plead insanity
and did argue self defense, see People v. Morton 570 N.Y.S.2d 846. 847 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991) (defendant argued that frail elderly mother tried to drown him in toilet
bowl and attacked him with oriental dance).
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fendant's refusal to accept his own mental illness may derive
from the mental illness itself. In this connection, the Kaczynski
defense team argued that Kaczynski's inability to tolerate psy-
chiatric examination and presentation of evidence of mental
illness was a direct result of his illness. °'
To address this concern, Richard Bonnie has proposed a
system in which judges may declare a defendant competent to
stand trial but decisionally incompetent; in other words, the de-
fendant would be deemed competent to assist but not to direct
or guide defense counsel. 06 Josephine Ross, who wrote an arti-
cle grappling with her own decision to impose a defense of
"nonresponsibility" upon a mentally ill client, characterizes her
approach as an "ethic of care" that emphasizes human inter-
connectedness and considers not only what is at stake in a given
criminal case but takes responsibility for a defendant's life as a
whole. °7
The concerns of best interests proponents extend to cases
in which a defendant's mental illness is not so severe as to cause
him to lose touch with reality, but nonetheless motivates a de-108
fendant to invite a death sentence. Depression may be at its
height following arrest for a capital crime and prior to trial.' °9
Some individuals decide that death is the preferential option in
the midst of the depression that follows announcement of the
guilty verdict."0 In other cases, mental illness or a client's dissat-
105 See note 4 supra. Kaczynski viewed psychiatrists as "agents of a science of the
brain given to mind control and personality alteration" who sought "to eliminate free
will and personal autonomy by creating a population that is wholly compliant with the
needs of an omnipotent system." Id. at 10 (Exhibit A, Declaration by Dr. David
Vernon Foster, M.D.).
106See note 211, 213 infra.
107See Ross, supra note 67, at 1373-80.
108 See Note, Due Process-Mental Competency to Waive Counsel and to Plead Guilty, 107
HARV. L. REV. 144, 155, 163 (1993). Bruce Ledewitz, who has represented many capi-
tal defendants, states that almost every client he has represented "at some point indi-
cated a desire not to oppose the death penalty." White, supra note 100, at 859. For a
discussion of why so many capital defendants express a preference for death, discuss-
ing the frequent combination of "macho" self image and a strong pull toward self de-
struction, see id. at 871-75.
109 See id. at 859.
110 See, e.g., Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1502 (11' h Cir. 1991) (arguing that
this "irrational" and "morose" state of mind created additional obligations for his at-
torneys to advise him). Depression among death row inmates appears to be rather
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isfaction with his attorney's performance during the guilt phase
appear to provide strong emotional influences upon a defen-
dant's decision."' The dangers inherent in allowing depressed
defendants to forego presentation of a case for mitigation are
particularly powerful in the death penalty context. This is be-
cause, while individuals on death row frequently change their
mind about whether or not they want to die,"2 a defendant who
has instructed her attorney to offer no evidence of mitigation
may subsequently find few legal avenues to appeal his death sen-
tence and present the case for allowing him to live.'3
This point of view-that counsel must act in her client's best
interests-is unquestionably at the core of counsel's ethical obli-
gations and the structure of the adversarial system,"' and noth-
ing in this paper is intended to undermine this view of counsel's
duty of zealous advocacy. By framing the conflict as one of best
widespread. A study of Florida death row inmates found that 35% attempted suicide
and 42% had seriously considered it. G. Richard Strafer, Volunteenngfor Execution:
Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CiUNt. L &
CRININOLOGY 860, 872 n.44 (1983).
III See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451, 1452 n.3 (1 ", Cir.
1986) (discussing effect of defendant's mental problems upon his decision-making
and citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIxrtY EC 7-12); White, supra note 100, at
860 (discussing Ledewitz's contention that the reasoning of many defendants who
want the death penalty is affected by mental disability); Emerson v. Granley, 91 F.3d
898, 906 (7h Cir. 1996) (Ripple, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing defen-
dant's "disgust" with attorney heading into sentencing).
See Richard C. Dieter, Ethical Choices for Attorneys W ose Clients Elect Execution, 3
GEo. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 799, 801 (1990) (defendants often decide the)' wnt to die and
ask attorney to suspend all appeals, then change their minds and want appeals to re-
sume). Bonnie acknowledges this problem but contends that it can be addressed if
attorneys "emphasize to the recalcitrant client how difficult it will be, after he has
been sentenced to death, to undo the consequences .. .." If, after such advice, a de-
fendant still insists on foregoing a mitigation presentation, he recommends the at-
torney should request an inquiry into the defendant's competence but then abide by
the preferences of an individual found competent. Bonnie, supra note 64, at 1388-89.
11 As one commentator points out, "choosing execution at the initial penalty trial
is likely to make the chance of successfully attacking the death penalty at a subse-
quent stage very slim." White, supra note 100, at 867.
114 Of course, counsel are not only representatives of parties but also officers of the
court. For this reason, there are limitations to counsel's freedom to act in her client's
best interests, as well as obligations on counsel which may be in tension with her cli-
ent's best interests. For example, counsel cannot participate in a fraud on the court
and, therefore, may not put a client on the stand and question her if counsel believes
that the witness is committing perjury. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L Co,,ucr R. 3.3
(1995).
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interests versus autonomy, however, advocates of attorney con-
trol of the defense make themselves vulnerable to the charge of
paternalism; that is, the criticism that, if the lawyer's only con-
cern is the defendant's best interests, the lawyer should accept
the best interests as articulated by that defendant."5
In an article describing her decision to impose a mental ill-
ness defense over a client's wishes, Josephine Ross acknowl-
edges, "[w]hen I weighed my client's best interests against her
right to autonomy, undoubtedly my definition of best interests
was a product of my own values, as was the weight I gave to my
client's autonomy. 16 She describes the difficulty inherent in
substituting one's judgment for a client's and the impossibility
of ascertaining the value that a client would place on various ob-
jectives were it not for that client's mental illness.17 For this rea-
son, Ross concludes that her justification for imposition of an
unwanted mental health defense cannot be supported when a
defendant's insistence on a different strategy is arguably moti-
vated by political objectives.""
The best interests point-of-view is thus an inadequate answer
to the autonomy viewpoint. It cannot fully address a case such
as Kaczynski's-whose illness is expressed through the vehicle of
a political philosophy-in that it fails to articulate a fundamental
rationale for authorizing attorney control over the decision to
present evidence of mental illness. The best interests point-of-
view fails to give adequate weight to society's interest in a full,
fair and final resolution of a criminal case: that is, society's in-
terest in the securing the integrity of the criminal process by en-
suring the presentation of important exculpatory evidence.
Possibly in recognition of the limitations of the best interests
philosophy, Ross, who characterizes her decision to impose a
115 Forjust such an argument, seeSlobogin & Mashburn, supra, note 67, at 1638-39.
16Ross, supra note 67, at 1346.
117 1& at 1371. Ross notes that she still argues that lawyers should have discretion
to take decisions away from mentally ill clients because the alternative-"mentally ill
clients who are adjudicated competent to stand trial will make these decisions"-is
worse and would sometimes "require the lawyer to engage in ineffective assistance of
counsel." Id. at 1371 n.109.
118Id at 1363-4. Ross cites as examples the cases of Kaczynski and John Salvi, who
murdered two women who worked in abortion clinics; both Kaczynski and Salvi fa-




mental health defense as motivated solely by her assessment of
her client's best interests, nonetheless acknowledges an overrid-
ing fairness concern: "What made me decide that it was impor-
tant to follow up on the client's mental health was my own sense
that it was wrong to allow Ms. Teplinski to be convicted for some-
thing that was really a product of her mental illness."""
III. VALUING THEJUSTICE INTEREST
By framing the issue as a conflict between the autonomy of
the individual defendant, on the one hand, and her best inter-
ests, on the other, current jurisprudence has overlooked the
overriding importance of the societal interest in a fair trial. Ac-
cordingly, our joint interest in due process of law, effective rep-
resentation, and the integrity of the criminal process has been
significantly undervalued, if not entirely subordinated, within
the current system. In this section, we discuss the nature of the
societal interest in relation to the contexts that are relevant
here, namely the determination of intent during the guilt phase
of a criminal trial and the consideration of evidence of mental
illness during the penalty phase of a capital trial. We then pro-
pose the recognition of a broader Justice Interest that would
prioritize vindication of the right to a fair trial in such circum-
stances.
A. THE NATURE OF TIS INTEREST WHEN MENTAL ILLNESS IS
INVOLVED
1. Convicting Only the Morally Culpable: Presentation of Evidence of Mental
Illness Related to Criminal Intent
It has long been established in our legal culture that an in-
dividual may be convicted of a crime, and bear the associated
stigma and punishment, only if she acted with criminal knowl-
edge and intent and, therefore, is responsible for her actions.
In moral terms, "'our collective conscience does not allow pun-
ishment where it cannot impose blame.'"'"' This interest finds
recognition in the rule that a judge may reject a guilty plea if
119 Id- at 1365 (emphasis added). See id. at 1375.
120 United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citations
omitted).
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convinced that the plea lacks a factual basis-in other words, if
there is insufficient proof that the defendant has committed the
offense.
One principle embodying this justice interest is the no-
tion that courts should not tolerate the conviction of persons
who are not guilty by virtue of lack of criminal knowledge or in-
tent. 2' This principle derives from the philosophical idea that
only those who have knowingly and freely embarked upon a
course of conduct deserve to be punished for the evil that they
have caused. 22 In his book discussing the relationship between
law and psychiatry, Professor Michael Moore traced the insanity
plea back to the idea that children under a certain age cannot
be held criminally responsible because they "knoweth not of
good and evil," an idea with religious origins, and set forth the
moral basis for holding individuals responsible for their acts:
[N] either the legal nor the psychiatric theory of the person departs sig-
nificantly from the ancient and commonsense idea that persons are be-
ings who are sufficiently rational, "in charge" of their actions, and
unified in their purposes, that they may justly be the subjects of praise
and blamejustly the holders of rights and of responsibilities. 23
This principle has an obvious and important application in
cases involving individuals suffering from mental illness because
"one whose acts would otherwise be criminal has committed no
crime at all if because of incapacity due to ... mental condition
he is not responsible for those acts. '' 2' The courts have recog-
121 For the tension between this idea and the legal concept of felony murder,
which allows conviction of an individual for murder, or even capital murder, despite
the absence of intent to kill, see Norman J. Finkel, Culpability & CommonsenseJustice:
Lessons Learned Betwixt Murder & Madness, 10 NoTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 11,
18-31 (1996).
122For discussion of the views of moral philosophers on the proper test for insan-
ity, see Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense
Jurisprudence, 40 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 599, 666-69 (1989/1990) (discussing the views of
Professors Stephen Morse and Michael Moore).
123MICHAEL S. MooRE, LAW & PSYcHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 5, 64-65
(1984).
124 Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also State v.
Smith, 564 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Wash. 1977) ("It would clearly be unconstitutional to
permit the conviction of a defendant who was legally insane at the time of the com-
mission of the crime.").
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nized that this principle is a fundamental one in American
criminal law. In a decision discussing the reason why Congress
did not abolish the insanity defense in the aftermath of the con-
troversy about would-be presidential assassin John Hinckley's
successful use of it, the Third Circuit commented:
Eventually, the abolition approach did not triumph. Congress pre-
served a limited affirmative insanity defense. It did so, however not be-
cause of doubts about the use of evidence to negate mens rea, but rather
because it felt that concerns about the dangers of an insanity defense
were overstated and because abolition "would alter that fundamental ba-
sis of Anglo-American criminal law. the existence of moral culpability as
a prerequisite for punishment"
1 2
As the Ninth Circuit noted in explaining the durability of the
M'Naghten test, "The right and wrong test has withstood the
onslaught of critics, not because it is scientifically perfect, but
because the courts regard it as the best criteria yet articulated
for ascertaining criminal responsibility which comports with the
moral feelings of the community."' 26 Judge Bazelon has even
suggested that it be made explicit that jurors are to "apply the
moral standards of the community" in deciding whether insan-
ity negates criminal responsibility; he proposes that jurors be in-
structed that a defendant is not responsible "if at the time of his
unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes or behavior
controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot justly
be held responsible."'2
2. Punishing Only the Morally Culpable: Ensuring Presentation of All
Mitigating Evidence in the Death Penalty Context
In the few decisions that have overturned death sentences
on the ground that the sentencing body had heard no mitigat-
ing evidence, the courts determined that society's interest in a
just process overrode a defendant's autonomy interest; thus,
while a defendant might have the right to make some decisions
surrounding his own defense, he does not have the right to of-
125United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 98-577, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 7-8 (1983)).
Sauer v. United States, 241 F. 2d 640, 649 (9th Cir. 1957), ovemled in part,
Wade v. United States, 426 F. 2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970).
127DAViD L. BAZELON, QuEmSONING AUTHORI JuSnCE AND CRmtL NA L,W 50-51
(1988).
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fer no defense whatsoever in a death penalty case.'12  Allowing a
defendant to forego presentation of mitigating circumstances
"violate[s] the fundamental public policy against misusing the
judicial system to commit a state-aided suicide."'29 To emphasize
this point, California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk ar-
gued that if a defendant has the right to prevent presentation of
a case against death, "he may as well be allowed to irrevocably
'plead death.' At least in such a situation, we avoid, both at trial
and on appeal, the unseemly spectacle of an empty charade."'8 0
The improbability that courts would ever allow a defendant to
choose death without a neutral fact-finder imposing such a sen-
tence demonstrates society's aversion to such an approach-but
if relevant, important arguments are kept from ajury and judge,
the result may be the same.'8 ' Justice Mosk has termed the sen-
tencing hearing that results when no defense to death is offered
CC,,132
a sham and a mockery ofjustice.
In overturning death sentences in this context, courts have
emphasized that holding a penalty hearing where the finder of
fact hears only the argument for death offends society's interests
in a reliable penalty determination and the fair punishment of
the individual.3 3 This societal interest in reliability derives not
128 Justice Mosk has compared allowing defendants to decide not to present miti-
gating evidence to allowing defendants the right to prosecute themselves. See People
v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 727 (Cal. 1989) (Mosk,J., concurring and dissenting) (also
arguing that Faretta is a "shield for the criminal defendant" but cannot be used as a
"sword . .. [to] undermine the adversary process" by agreeing with the prosecutor
that death is appropriate).
129People v. Deere (Deere I), 710 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1985).
130 People v. Howard, 824 P.2d 1315 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk,J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
131 But see People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 594 (Cal. 1990) (concluding that de-
fendant's refusal to present mitigating evidence was "not tantamount to a guilty plea,"
in part because it "did not necessarily make it any more likely that the jury would find
death was the appropriate penalty.").
132People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 726-27 (Cal. 1989) (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
133See People v. Deere (Deere I), 710 P.2d at 934-35; State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d
939 (N.J. 1988). See also Defendant Kaczynski's Response to Government's Motion for
a Hearing on Issues Concerning the Defendant's Representation, United States v.
TheodoreJohn Kaczynski, No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 27878, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
21, 1998). But cf. People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 51 Cal.3d 471, 525-26 (Cal. 1990)
(acknowledging but rejecting such a concern); People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 652-56
(Cal. 1989) (same).
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only from the need for appropriate sentences generally, but
from Supreme Court rulings that the imposition of a death sen-
tence demands a higher degree of reliability than other pun-
ishments."m In this connection, the Court has determined that
the Eighth Amendment requires that state death penalty statu-
tory schemes provide for such an individualized inquiry, includ-
ing consideration of appropriate mitigating circumstances." '
Presentation of only one side, the case for death, defeats this so-
cietal interest in an individually tailored penalty determina-
tion.3 When there is no attempt to build a record of mitigating
evidence, neither the sentencer nor the appellate court can ex-
ercise its responsibility to insure that the imposition of death is
reliable and based on the available evidence. 37 "[P]ossession of
the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life
and characteristics is [hlighly relevant-if not essential-[to the] se-
lection of an appropriate sentence."
For this reason, some courts have found that not only must
state law provide for such an individualized sentencing proce-
134 See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (citations omitted)
("[T]he qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a corre-
spondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.");
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (finality of death mandates
higher degree of reliability in imposing death sentence).
135See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (citations omitted) (state sen-
tencing procedures must provide "meaningful basis for distinguishing" when death is
appropriate sentence, to avoid "arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death pen-
alty."); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05 (imposition of death sentence requires considera-
tion of individual defendant's character and circumstances); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 189-90 (1976) (to avoid arbitrariness, all circumstances of offense and of-
fender must be taken into account).
136 AsJustice Mosk has explained, "Manifestly, the penalty phase of a capital trial..
is an adversary process... . 'The system assumes that adversarial testing %ill ulti-
mately advance the public interest in truth and fairness.' ... When such testing is ab-
sent, the process breaks down and hence its result must be deemed unreliable as a
matter of law."). People v. Bloom, 774 P.2d 698, 724 (Cal. 1989) (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (citation omitted).
137 See, e.g., Deere 1, 710 P.2d 929-30; State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 993-95 (N.J.
1988). Because of concerns over reliability, courts in seven states will not allow de-
fendants to waive appellate review of their death sentence, and other states have es-
tablished a statutorily mandated appeal. See Laura A. Rosenwald, Death Wish: Mhat
Washington Courts Should Do When a Capital Defendant Wants to Die, 68 WASH. L REV.
735, 741 (1993).
138Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis in original).
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dure, but this inquiry must take place in each individual case." 9
This extension of Supreme Court doctrine seems logical, for
when defendants block presentation of mitigating circum-
stances a court clearly cannot deliver a reliable verdict. " The
only difference between such cases and the instances in which
the Supreme Court has overturned death sentences because
state procedures prevented presentation of mitigating circum-
stances is the source of the barrier: the individual defendant in-
stead of the state. If one believes that the state interest in
reliable imposition of death sentences is independent of the in-
dividual defendant's right to a reliable sentence, then there is
no logical basis for allowing anyone to thwart an individualized
penalty determination. Regardless of whether the individual
defendant or the state procedures are the cause, the result is the
same: it "excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigat-
ing factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.''
Thus allowing the defendant to waive presentation of a case
against death is impermissible because it is not solely the defen-
dant's decision to make.
In a series of dissents, Justice Thurgood Marshall4 3 objected
to allowing defendants to waive appeals of their death sentences
for precisely the same reasoning:
139 See State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 994 (N.J. 1988) (citing Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972)). See also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95.
140 The Kaczynski defense team relied on this line of reasoning in arguing that
federal law provides for presentation of all mitigating factors and requires the jury to
weigh all aggravating and mitigating circumstances. "Where available mitigating evi-
dence is withheld from the jury's consideration, the jury cannot effectively discharge
its statutory duty of determining whether a life or death sentence is appropriate un-
der all the circumstances of the case." Defendant Kaczynski's Response, supra note
133, at *3.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
142 See Rosenwald, supra note 137, at 750 (arguing that when no mitigating evi-
dence is presented, the death sentence becomes automatic, violating Supreme Court
jurisprudence striking down automatic death penalty statutes); Carter, supra note 65,
at 128 (arguing that there is no "right to choose a penalty" and that the societal inter-
est in imposing a fair sentence therefore outweighs the defendant's waiver of the
right to present mitigating evidence).
143 The irony of the Kaczynski breakdown again presents itself: the members of the
Court who are traditionally the most pro-defendant, Justices Marshall and Brennan,
end up arguing for overriding the wishes of the defendant, while the pro-prosecution
Justices argue for respect for and deference to defendant wishes.
206 [Vol. 91
FAIRNESS AND FARETA2
A defendant's voluntary submission to a barbaric punishment does
not ameliorate the harm that imposing such a punishment causes to our
basic societal values and to the integrity of our system of justice....
When a capital defendant seeks to circumvent procedures necessary to
ensure the propriety of his conviction and sentence, he does not ask the
State to permit him to take his own life. Rather, he invites the State to
violate two of the most basic norms of a civilized society-that the State's
penal authority be invoked only where necessary to serve the ends ofjus-
tice, not the ends of a particular individual, and that punishment be im-
posed only where the State has adequate assurance that the punishment
is justified."'
One criticism of this line of argument suggests that there is
no real societal interest in making sure that an argument against
death is made in every case. Rather, the decision of whether to
vindicate or waive the right to individualized sentencing belongs
to each individual defendant. Richard Bonnie points out that
this societal interest in "individualization," which focuses on the
defendant's individual interests, differs from the "legality" inter-
est that has become the focus of many cases demanding a co-
herent statutory scheme for imposing sentence. He concludes,
"the value being protected in the 'individualization' decisions is
not a societal interest in promoting leniency in reducing the
number of death sentences, but rather the defendant's interest
in having an opportunity to seek leniency in his own case. ' 45
And although the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on
this question, the Court's treatment of cases in which defen-
dants have blocked any presentation of a case for mitigation
suggest that the absence of such evidence does not pose a major
concern for members of the Supreme Court.""
144 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 173 (1990) (MarshallJ., dissenting). See
also Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725, 726 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ('I do not
believe that a defendant may by his consent permit a State to impose a punishment
forbidden by the Constitution."); Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("Society's independent stake in enforcement of the Eight Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment cannot be overriden by a defen-
dant's purported waiver."). See also Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case
does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eight
Amendment.").
145 Bonnie, supra note 64, at 1383-84.
146 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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B. FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY AND THE CLEARLY DEFINED PURPOSE OF
THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
In a recent special concurrence affirming the conviction of
a defendant who had represented himself at trial, Judge Rein-
hardt of the Ninth Circuit explicitly raised the question whether
the right to self representation overrides a defendant's right to a
fair trial. His opinion reasons that, while the Due Process
Clause's guarantee of a fair trial is absolute and is central to the
protections provided under the Constitution that secure liberty
and freedom, the right of self representation is not absolute and
is rooted in the Sixth Amendment, the purpose of which is to
ensure the fairness of a criminal trial.' 47 However, "the right to
self representation has now been extended to the point that it
frequently, though not always, conflicts squarely and inherently
with the right to a fair trial." "8 Thus, "elevating a Sixth
Amendment procedural right over the fundamental right to a
fair trial, as Faretta implicitly does, impermissibly elevates form
over substance."" 9 Judge Reinhardt's concurrence therefore
proposes that the Supreme Court address the question whether
a defendant may waive his right to a fair trial; he suggests that
the State's "compelling interest, related to its own political le-
gitimacy, in ensuring both fair procedures and reliable out-
comes in criminal trials" require that this question be answered
in the negative."O
The Due Process Clause establishes an individual guarantee
to the "fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial."'1'
This guarantee is absolute52 and is essential to the preservation
of all other rights. 5 Two centuries of constitutional interpreta-
tion have firmly established this right in the form of numerous
147See United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
148 &L at 1107.
149 id at 1105.
50Id. at 1107.
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967); see also Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).
152 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
153Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
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procedural and substantive protections for an individual ac-
cused of a crime.
The fairness of the criminal process, however, also has so-
cietal value-a value beyond the interest of an individual criminal
defendant. All persons associated with the criminal justice pro-
cess, directly or indirectly, share an interest in the fairness of the
process. All of us suffer a harm if the criminal process is unjust;
we may fear that similar injustice will be visited upon us directly
or we may be offended knowing that we support (through jury
service, electing judges or district attorneys, or taxation) a proc-
ess that fails to treat human beings in a just manner. The
criminal justice system speaks in our name and, therefore, each
of us is implicated when that voice offends shared notions of
"decency and fairness." m' The communicative role that trials
play demonstrate the centrality of the value of a fair trial in our
system of rights:
Trials can bring "community catharsis," but to do so they must serve
not only the substance but also "the appearance of justice." This lan-
guage brings to the surface the communicative purposes of criminal trials.
As Thurman Arnold, among others, has argued, the trial is an important
occasion for dramatic enactment, the symbolic representation of the
community's most deeply held values. On the one hand, we desire the
reassurance of safety and the satisfaction of revenge .... On the other
hand, we require the reaffirmation of our individualist values, of the
separateness and sanctity of every individual; these are the values ex-
pressed in the rights and restrictions, even the "technicalities," embed-
ded in our criminal procedure. The criminal trial, as the most vivid and
visible intersection of state and individual, simultaneously affirms the
needs of both our collective and separate selves. 1
5
For this reason, the "clearly defined purpose" of the crimi-
nal justice process is "to provide a fair and reliable determina-
154 According to Justice Frankfurter:
The exact question is whether the criminal proceedings that resulted in [the] conviction
deprived [the defendant] of the due process of law by which he was constitutionally enti-
tled to have his guilt determined. Judicial rciew of that guaranty ... inescapably imposes
upon this Court an exercise ofjudgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in or-
der to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express
the notions ofjustice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses.
Malinski v. NewYork, 324 U.S. 401,416-17 (1945) (FrankfurterJ., concurring).
155Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1982).
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tion of guilt." 56 In this sense, the right to a fair trial not only
benefits an individual criminal defendant, but also underlies the
structure of our criminal justice process. Fairness, then, is
both an individual right and the purpose for which the criminal
justice process exists. As such, fairness is a shared, societal value
deserving greater priority than autonomy.
This valuation of fairness strongly suggests that evidence of
mental illness, and the corresponding defense, must be pre-
sented to the trier of fact. If the clearly defined purpose of the
criminal justice process is a fair and reliable determination of
guilt, then evidence relevant to criminal intent should be pre-
sented at trial. The choice to exclude such evidence, even if it is
the autonomous choice of the criminal defendant, undermines
the factual basis of a verdict or sentence, thereby rendering it
unjust and unreliable. For this reason, in making determina-
tions of culpability and punishment, triers of fact should be af-
forded the opportunity to consider important relevant evidence,
including evidence of mental illness, whether or not an individ-
ual criminal defendant would elect to allow this evidence to be
presented. Justice, in other words, presupposes a category of
exculpatory evidence-evidence of mental disability-that must be
presented to a trier of fact in order to guarantee the integrity of
the criminal justice process. This concept of justice flows not
from the individual rights established in the Sixth Amendment
but from the societal interests reflected in the a "fundamental,
absolute right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal"'158 and in the
Eighth Amendment.
In this sense, we propose that the right to a fair trial be
viewed as a right that cannot be waived by an individual, like
other rights that vindicate societal values. For example, it would
not be controversial to propose that a defendant who wishes to
be tortured, or does not object to being tortured, would not be
allowed to waive the Eighth Amendment proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment. Although the wording of the
Eighth and Sixth Amendments differs, we propose that the val-
156 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 557 (Warren, CJ., concurring). See also United States
v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt,J., concurring) ("In short,
a fair trial is a proceeding that is designed to maximize the likelihood of a fair and re-
liable determination of guilt or innocence.").
157See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 n.23 (1968).
158 Farhad, 190 F.3d at 1105 (Reinhardt,J., concurring).
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ues protected by these constitutional protections are similar and
that the right to a fair trial should not be waivable by a criminal
defendant who seeks to represent herself (and block the presen-
tation of critical evidence) .'
In a broad sense, we seek to apply a philosophical notion of
justice related to John Rawls' concept of a "well ordered soci-
ety," which focuses on the well-being of the less privileged
members of society and measures society's legitimacy by exam-
ining the extent to which it can justify its norms and institutions
to all of its members.' 6
C. INCLUDING JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE
With the exceptions previously discussed, courts at all levels
have failed to recognize that this societal interest in justice must
sometimes override a defendant's individual autonomy interest.
In the few cases in which defendants have advocated for a rec-
ognition of such a fair trial or justice interest, and argued on
appeal that the trial court should have intervened sua sponte to
declare a mistrial or otherwise act to protect the defendants'
rights despite assertion of the Faretta right, the courts have
treated this "fair trial" argument as a disguised claim of ineffec-
tive assistance and, therefore, considered only whether the
court or the prosecution acted affirmatively to deny the right to
a fair trial. In United States v. McDowell, for example, the Sixth
Circuit rejected a "fair trial" claim asserted by a pro se defendant,
reasoning that "[t]he only thing that was 'unfair' about McDow-
eli's trial was that he did not represent himself very well" and
J59judge Reinhardt's concurrence in Farhad relies upon this institutional interest
in the appearance of fairness to suggest that the right to a fair trial might not be sub-
ject to waiver. See id. at 1107-08 (Reinhardt,J., concurring).
160JoHNRAWLs, ATHEORyOFJUSTicE (1971). Raws developed the notion of a well-
ordered society as a grand theory of distributive justice in the social and economic
arena. Rawis developed this notion largely in reaction to the hegemony of utilitarian
notions that measure justice in terms of wealth maximization: that is, that the proper
social and economic order is one which society is doing well in the aggregate. Rather
than focusing on the aggregate, Rawis focused on the least privileged individuals and
asked whether or not a privileged person could justify a particular economic ar-
rangement to the less privileged person. This perspective explicitly rejected prevail-
ing utilitarian notions of distributive justice and implicitly rejected their civil
libertarian counterparts. This perspective also rejects individualistic notions of rights
that fail to consider the relatedness among individual rights as well as between indi-
vidual rights and social interests.
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that Faretta precluded such objections. 6' The court's conclusory
reasoning failed to even address the basis for the defendant's
claim that his trial had been unfair. In United States v. Pavich,
the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue more directly and held
that a trial judge has no obligation to intervene to protect a pro
se defendant's right to a fair trial:
Given the absolute right of self representation of Farelta, a residual
right to insist upon a certain quality of that representation would result
in unbearable appellate burdens, if not chaos. It would encourage every
defendant to undertake his own defense for the manifold advantages it
would give him: first, by appearing before the jury relatively undefended
he would tend to gain the jury's sympathy; failing in that he could delib-
erately introduce confusion and hope that chance would work its way in
his favor; and finally, if all else failed, he could seek review on the basis
of his inept representation. He would have three different days in court
at a minimum.
State courts that have addressed this issue have reached similar
conclusions. 1
63
1. Limited, Implicit Recognition that Fairness May Override an Interest in
Autonomy
However, in two contexts, courts have acknowledged that a
defendant does not have an unfettered right to assert or waive
all constitutional rights and that concerns about fairness may at
times override the defendant's individual autonomy interest.
161 United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251 (6th Cir. 1987). See also United
States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988) (relying upon McDowell to reach
the same conclusion).
United States v. Pavich, 568 F.2d 33, 39 (7th Cir. 1978). When sitting by desig-
nation in the First Circuit, Judge Reinhardt wrote another concurring opinion fore-
shadowing the concern about the fairness of trials in which defendants represent
themselves that he later expressed forcefully in Farhad. In United States v. Nivica, 887
F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989),Judge Reinhardt suggested that a trial judge should have
intervened sua sponte to suggest that an attorney take over questioning of the defen-
dant when the defendant's ineptness in questioning himself was causing a denial of
his fundamental right to testify on his own behalf. Id. at 1128 (Reinhardt,J., concur-
ring).
163 See, e.g., Bowen v. State, 677 So.2d 863 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996) (error to deny self
representation to a defendant on the basis that trial would be unfair); Common-
wealth v. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401, 404-05 (Mass. 1995) (errors by pro se defendant
were "inherent in the risk he assumed" and "[n]either the trial judge nor the prose-
cutor impaired the defendant's right to represent himself in a fair proceeding.").
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Although upholding the entry of a guilty plea by a defendant
who continued to insist that he was innocent, in Alford the Su-
preme Court did acknowledge that "[a] criminal defendant
does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have
his guilty plea accepted by the court.""" The authority recog-
nized in A/ford-judicial discretion to reject guilty pleas-assumes
an independent judicial duty to "make certain that the innocent
go free as it is that the guilty be punished."'c' A defendant also
does not have the absolute right to waive the right to a jury trial
(because the government's interest in justice is also implicated
by the choice of fact finder).'6 In limited circumstances, the
Supreme Court has thus recognized-without fully articulating-a
societal interest in justice that outweighs other constitutional
protections which vindicate an autonomy interest. Nonetheless,
the balancing of rights that courts have conducted in some
other contexts suggests that such balancing may be viable here.
Particular support for our argument that the societal inter-
est injustice outweighs the procedural individual guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment can be found in the analogous context of
waivers of attorney-client conflicts of interest. The Supreme
Court has held that an individual's right to choose her own
counsel is not absolute but is circumscribed by the "institutional
interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases. " ' 7
This "institutional interest" follows from a court's "independent
interest in ensuring that... legal proceedings appear fair to all
16 North Carolina v. Alford 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.l 1 (1970) (citing Lynch v. Overhol-
ser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962)).
16 Lynch, 369 U.S. at 732 (ClarkJ., dissenting).
16 See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
167 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988). In an important predecessor
to MWhea the District of Columbia Circuit discussed how a court should handle a
situation in which the right to counsel of one's choice conflicts with the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. In Lewis v. United States, 430 A.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
the majority held that the court had no obligation to accept the defendant's waiver,
and that Faretta did not imply a right to waive effective assistance of counsel. Id. at
531 & n.7. Judge Newman dissented, commenting that the defendant was "waiving
one constitutional prerogative while at the same time attempting to fully exercise an-
other, i.e., the right to counsel of his own choice. Where defendant has chosen to
exercise one constitutional guarantee over another and has done so knowingly and
intelligently, and where neither of the two rights is a 'preferred' right, I would con-
clude that it is reversible error for the court to refuse to honor his decision." Id. at
532-33 (Newman,J., dissenting).
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who observe them.' ' Because of this independent interest and
the dangers posed by multiple representation, a court need not
accept a defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel:
[N]o such flat rule can be deduced from the Sixth Amendment pre-
sumption in favor of counsel of choice. Federal courts have an inde-
pendent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within
the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear
fair to all who observe them.. . . Not only the interest of a criminal de-
fendant but the institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in
criminal cases may be jeopardized by unregulated multiple representa-
tion. 1
69
Thus, in the context of deciding whether a defendant may
choose conflicted counsel, "[t] he Supreme Court has previously
recognized that individual Sixth Amendment rights are subor-
dinate to society's interest in assuring fair trials." 7 Justice Mar-
shall has cited such cases as demonstrating that "It]his Court
has recognized in other contexts that societal interests may jus-
tify limiting a competent person's ability to waive a constitu-
tional protection."
7
2. Explicit Recognition that Other Values-Namely, Order and Decorum-Over-
ride the Autonomy Interest
Although Faretta and its jurisprudence places an individual's
autonomy interest above her right to effective assistance of
counsel and therefore, implicitly, over the right to a fair trial,
other societal interests have been held sufficient to override the
defendant's autonomy.7 2 The right of self representation may
168Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159.
169 Id. at 160. As in Faretta, the liberals on the Court were on the side of autonomy
in Wheat. Justice Marshall filed a vigorous dissent, agreeing that the Sixth Amend-
ment provides a non-absolute right to choose one's attorney and that this may be
overridden by concern about the fairness of a trial, but "because of the importance of
the right at stake" disagreeing with the deference shown to the trial court. Justices
Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun also dissented.
170 United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160).
171 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 175 (1990) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
172 In fact, some of the earlier decisions allowing imposition of an insanity plea
over a defendant's objection, while framing the justification as serving the defen-
dant's best interests, may have actually rested upon concern over the threat to societal
order posed by mentally ill individuals. See Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388, 393-94
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be limited when it intrudes upon decorum or order in the
courtroom:
[T]he trial judge may terminate self representation by a defendant
who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct....
The right of self representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of
the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law. 17
Therefore, a defendant who seeks to represent herself must
be "able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and court-
room protocol."' 74 As one commentator pointed out, "even in
the context of the hallowed right to self representation, the sys-
temic interest in just proceedings prevails over the individual
right" and allows some limitations on Faretta rights.' Other de-
cisions have allowed the appointment of standby counsel over a
defendant's objection or limited the right of self representation
in response to witnesses' concerns.
176
(D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). This interest can also be
characterized much less favorably, as resting upon society's fear of the mentally ill
and the state's effort to control them. See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, Abolhsh the "Insanty
Defense"-Why Not, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 864-68 (1963). Language used by courts suggests
that this rationale often lies behind assertions of concern about the defendant's own
welfare; for example, the Colorado Supreme Court cited the state's interest in "public
safety and welfare" as its justification for overriding the defendant's traditional trial
rights. Les v. Meredith, 561 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Colo. 1977). For even if "the defendant
... does not want such protection," the state may have the right to insist on "protec-
tion of the welfare of its citizenry." Id., at 1258. It is often not clear in these cases
whether the court seeks to protect the mentally ill members of society, or the rest of
society from the mentally ill. The concern that mentally ill individuals may make irra-
tional choices that ultimately prove harmful to their own well-being provides an ar-
gument that someone else should step in to take the decision away from the disabled
defendant.
173 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
174McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 (1984).
175See Carter, supra note 65, at 109. These limits include the requirements of a
knowing and intelligent waiver, appointment of standby counsel over the defendant's
objections, denial of self representation when the request is untimely or for purposes
of delay, and revocation of the right of self representation in the case of disruption.
See id
176 See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (court may appoint standby counsel over de-
fendant's objection); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187 (1984) (standby counsel
may participate in trial, without defendant's consent, as long as it still appears that the
defendant is representing himself); Fields v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024. 1035 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding that right to self representation can be properly restricted by disallow-
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In a 1991 decision, Savage v. Estelle, the Ninth Circuit ap-
peared to extend the notion that a defendant's Faretta right
could be limited based on the need for order or decorum in the
courtroom to a case implicating fundamental fairness concerns.
The court upheld the effective denial of self representation to a
defendant with a severe stutter, reasoning that
"[c] ommunicating with the fact finder (here, a jury) is the es-
sence of a trial" and that the defendant's inability to formulate
questions due to his stutter "rendered him unable to abide by
the rules of courtroom procedure." The court essentially
couched its concern about the defendant's ability to present his
defense as resting on the defendant's inability to comply with
courtroom procedure. However, the Ninth Circuit subse-
quently made it clear that Savage's import was very narrow in a
decision rejecting denial of the right of self representation on
the ground that a defendant's inadequate education would
render him unable to abide by the rules of procedure. The
court held:
In Savage, the defendant suffered from a physical disability which
rendered him incapable of exercising his right to self representation.
No physical bars were identified that might have prevented Peters from
abiding by the rules of procedure or courtroom protocol. The trial
court's denial of Peters' motion was based on incompetence. According
to appellants, Peters' intellectual barriers to mounting a capable self-
defense are analogous to Savage's physical barriers. 78
For these reasons, we propose that the recognition of the
overriding import of the value of fairness, in combination with
the acknowledgment that the right of self representation is not
absolute, compels the conclusion that fairness must trump
autonomy in the set of cases with which this article is concerned.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
In those cases in which a defendant's mental illness under-
mines the functioning of the adversary system, the duty of en-
ing defendant from personally cross examining children who he had allegedly mo-
lested).
177Savage v. Estelle, 924 F.2d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1991).
178Peters v. Gunn, 33 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1994). In Peters, the defendant had
not even finished high school. The court declined to consider the question whether
a defendant who was illiterate could be denied self representation on that ground.
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suring the basic fairness of the trial or sentencing procedure
must fall to the defendant's lawyer or to the court itself. We
propose that major reforms to the functioning of the criminal
justice system are necessary in order to vindicate society's inter-
est injustice while continuing to afford some recognition of the
importance of the defendant's dignity and autonomy. First, the
ethical rules must be modified to clearly allocate the authority
to present evidence of mental illness to defense counsel, regard-
less of the defendant's wishes. Second, in order to avoid a result
that would further undermine the fairness of trials of mentally
ill defendants, Faretta's grant of an absolute right to self repre-
sentation must be overruled. Finally, in recognition of a defen-
dant's legitimate desire to present the defense of her choosing,
we advocate a legislative recognition of a right to a bifurcated
trial, in which a defendant could first present her chosen de-
fense and then defense counsel could present a defense based
on mental illness.
The proposed bifurcation would balance a defendant's in-
terest in autonomy against society's interest in ensuring the le-
gitimacy and integrity of the process. Defendants should not be
forced to sacrifice the right to fairness in order to protect an in-
terest in autonomy. An "undeniable tension" arises when a de-
fendant is forced to relinquish the protection of one
constitutional right in order to enjoy another.'9 In order to re-
solve such tension in a different context, the Supreme Court has
held that a defendant may testify in support of a motion to sup-
press without waiving his Fifth Amendment right at trial; that is,
she may testify regarding the suppression issue without being
confronted by that testimony at trialY We propose an analo-
gous reconciliation of rights here.
A. GRANTING AUTHORITY TO DEFENSE COUNSEL
The current ethical rules and legal jurisprudence fail to
provide authoritative guidance regarding the allocation of
authority over the decision whether to present evidence of men-
tal illness. As discussed above, the only point on which there
appears to be a relative consensus among the authorities is that
the decision whether to enter an insanity plea belongs to a de-
179Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
I!bid.
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fendant. No such clear guidance is available to a lawyer whose
client objects to presentation of evidence of mental illness that
will mitigate guilt or punishment.
The problem with this state of affairs is twofold. First, a
conscientious attorney who strives to respect the ethical guide-
lines that govern the profession is left with little advice as to how
to handle a dispute with his client.'"' Second, when an attorney
concludes that she is required to forego presentation of relevant
evidence of mental illness-whether that decision is motivated by
sincere adherence to her reading of the ethical rules or by relief
that the ethical rules provide an excuse to avoid the foreboding
prospect of preparing a mental health defense-the court is de-
prived of essential evidence relevant to both guilt and punish-
ment, defeating society's interest in justice in the individual
case.
For these reasons, we advocate that the ethical rules be re-
formed to clarify that, when defense counsel concludes that a
defendant's decision-making capacity is undermined by mental
illness, counsel has the authority to decide to present a mental
health defense, enter an insanity plea, or present mitigating
evidence of mental illness, regardless of the defendant's
wishes. 8 2 The Colorado Supreme Court, interpreting a state
181 In a case such as Kaczynski's, when the court itself is required to step in to me-
diate a lawyer-client dispute, the lack of clarity in the law leaves the court with little
guidance in reaching its decision. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. Whether
Judge Burrell's decision that defense counsel could impose a diminished capacity de-
fense over the defendant's objection would survive an appeal was therefore highly
uncertain, and he acknowledged the uncertainty in the law at the time that he ruled
that defense counsel could assert the mental health defense. See Pre-Trial Transcript,
supra note 3, at *3 ("I think counsel for the defense controls the mental status de-
fense... Well, I understand there's a lot of authority on the issue. I don't believe all
cases are consistent in deciding the issue, and I have decided as I've stated."). After
Kaczynski asserted his right to self representation in response, and the government
warned of the prospect of "grave appellate error," Judge Burrell appeared to recon-
sider his decision, commenting, "[K]nowing that he only wants to represent himself
because of his dispute with trial counsel over the assertion of the mental status de-
fense . . . [k]nowing that he would prefer to be represented by present trial counsel
without assertion of that defense, it seems that the Government's position is persua-
sive... it seems to me that if I find he is competent ... given the scenario I just re-
lated, it would seem to me that his present trial counsel should represent him, if that
is his desire, without assertion of the defense." Official Trial Transcript, supra note 3,
at *14.
182 The justice principle that we conclude requires the presentation of relevant
evidence that negates guilt or diminishes criminal responsibility is subject to impor-
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statute that gives such authority to defense counsel (subject to
court approval), proposes that the defendant's choice to forego
an insanity-based defense be given "substantial weight" and
mandates that it be respected unless "founded in the defen-
dant's delusions or is otherwise devoid of a rational basis." ' ss
These rules should require an attorney who doubts his client's
mental state to take all possible steps to fully inform himself
about this subject, including arranging for a psychiatric exami-
nation if the defendant is willing to submit to one, before decid-
ing to override his client's decision. Nonetheless, the final
decision will be left to the judgment of defense counsel, with
two limitations on this discretion: first, defendants would be
able, on post-conviction review, to challenge counsel's imposi-
tion of a mental health defense on the grounds of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel;'4 and second, to protect the client's
autonomy interest, we propose that bifurcation be authorized
only upon an in camera showing by counsel (to ajudicial officer)
that the mental health evidence is necessary for a fair trial and
the client would not consent to presentation of such evidence
unless the trial were to be bifurcated.
Our proposal does not defer to the careful distinction cur-
rently drawn between entry of an insanity plea and presentation
of evidence of diminished capacity. Those who assert that the
law should treat these decisions differently rely primarily upon
two arguments: first, that the rule that a defendant controls
which plea to enter requires a defendant's consent before entry
of a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea can be made; and sec-
ond, that while a successful mental health defense will result in
acquittal or conviction of a lesser offense, a successful insanity
tant limitations within the criminal justice process. It is, for example, subject to pro-
cedural limitations designed to ensure the workings of the adversarial process. For
example, a successful alibi or necessity defense would, like an insanity defense, fully
absolve an accused person of criminal responsibility; nevertheless, few would suggest
that a court has the power to require that a defendant present either of these de-
fenses. This question, of course, would not often present itself given that a court
would not have an opportunity to discover these defenses for a defendant. See State v.
Jones, 664 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Wash. 1983) (declining to impose insanity defense in
part based on analogizing to defenses of alibi or self defense).
183 Hendricks v. People, 10 P.3d 1231, 1242 (Colo. 2000).
1 For a discussion of why such decisions are better left to defense counsel than to
a trial judge, see Ross, supra note 67, at 1382-83.
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plea will result in indefinite involuntary commitment in a men-
tal institution.
The first distinction strikes the authors as extremely formal-
istic given that both defenses (insanity and diminished capacity)
require acknowledgment by the defendant or her counsel that
the defendant has committed the acts that constitute the of-
fense. Such a formalistic distinction, moreover, is increasingly
untenable given that nationwide reforms have rendered the in-
sanity plea increasingly similar to a diminished capacity de-
fense.
The second distinction does pose a more serious concern,
for a defendant's personal interest in rejecting such indefinite
commitment is strong.8 6  In reality, however, indefinite com-
mitment may be imposed under state and federal statutes
whether or not an insanity defense is raised.187  Therefore, a
mentally ill person might face the risk of indefinite commitment
185 Twelve states have replaced a not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict with a
"guilty but mentally ill" verdict, which allows a finding of guilt and imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment. See Richard Carelli, DuPont Appeal Rejected by Court, AP
ONUNE, available at 2000 WL 22885671 (June 12, 2000); Lisa Levitt Ryckman, Family
Seeks to Change State Law in Memory of Murdered Daughter, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEws, Nov. 14, 1999, at D24. Prisons are supposed to provide mental health treat-
ment for defendants adjudicated mentally ill, but some contend that this requirement
often goes unmet. Seven states have narrowed their substantive insanity tests, sixteen
shifted the burden of proof to the defense, and twenty-five made it more difficult to
release individuals from mental hospitals after being adjudicated insane. See Michael
L. Purlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me". The Insanity Defense, the Authon-
tarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and The Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375,
1376-77 (1997).
186 This is especially true in cases in which a defendant is accused of a crime that
carries a light sentence and an adjudication of insanity may therefore result in longer
incarceration than a guilty verdict. See generally Ross, supra note 67 (discussing pro-
priety of imposing mental health defense in case in which mentally ill client could
likely have received probationary sentence in return for guilty plea). David Katner's
analysis of the ethical rules governing defense attorneys concludes that courts allow
defendants exclusive control over whether to claim insanity because of the prospect
of involuntary commitment in a mental institution, which distinguishes it from all
other affirmative defenses. See Katner, supra note 51.
187 18 U.S.C. § 4244 authorizes the district court to require a defendant to submit
to a post-conviction, pre-sentencing psychiatric examination to determine whether or
not in-custody treatment is warranted. Civil commitment statutes, both state and fed-
eral, provide authority for detention after a defendant has served a criminal sentence.
See, e.g.,Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 & n.25 (1972) (discussing standards for
civil commitment proceedings); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventetive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1431 & n.6 (2001)
(discussing state statutes which authorize civil detention of certain sex offenders).
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whether she raises an insanity defense or not. A successful in-
sanity defense does not, in sum, represent the only danger of
indefinite commitment; that risk also exists after a conviction
that results from the failure to raise an insanity defense.
The strongest philosophical objection to this proposal is
that, especially in cases in which a defendant's mental health is
subject to debate, it allows an attorney to override the legitimate
preferences of an individual whose interests are at stake. A re-
cent article on this subject concludes that the subjective nature
of diagnoses of mental illness, in combination with the rational
reasons for foregoing presentation of evidence of mental illness,
require attorneys to defer to client preferences in all but the
most rare of cases."" We propose that these matters are appro-
priately left to defense counsel who must conscientiously evalu-
ate the strength of the evidence of mental illness, carefully
consider the defendant's articulated reasons for resisting such
evidence, and attempt to separate the preferences that are ra-
tionally based from those derive from the mental illness itself.
The major practical obstacle to implementation of a system
in which a lawyer has the authority to impose presentation of
evidence of mental illness is that a determined defendant will
often resist any efforts to portray him as mentally ill. Because an
insanity plea or mental health defense is only rarely successful
even in the best of circumstances,b an attorney who relies on a
theory of mental health impairment will need to present all
available evidence of mental illness, including expert testi-
mony.190 However, in order to present expert testimony on this
" Seegenerally, Slobogin & Mashburn, supra, note 67.
' A 1991 study of the use of the insanity plea in eight states found that defendants
raised an insanity defense in under 1% of all criminal cases, and that those who raised
the defense succeeded about 25% of the time. See Gordon Witkin, W at Does It Taker to
Be Crazy7, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP.,Jan. 12, 1998, at 7; George L Blau & Richard A.
Pasewark, Statutory Changes and the Insanity Defense: Sedeing the Perfect Insane Person, 18
LAw& PSYClOL REv. 69, 72 (1994) (citing study by McGinley & Pasewark).
19 For a discussion of the importance of expert testimony in presenting a mental
health defense, see generally, R.D. MACKtAY, MENtAL CODON DEFENCES iN THE
CaslNAL LAW 186 (1995); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, The Law and the
Brain:Judging Scientific Evidence of Intent, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 243. 259-60 (1999);
Ken-in Maureen McCormick, The Constitutional Right to Psychiatrir Assistance: Cause for
Reexamination of Ake, 30 AM. CRiN. L. REv. 1329, 1338-42 (1993); A. Michelle Willis,
Nonpsychiatric Expert Assistance and the Requisite Showing of Need: A Catch-22 in the Post-
Ake Criminal Justice System, 37 EMORYL.J. 995 (1988). In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985), the Supreme Court held that when a defendant makes a showing that his san-
2000]
MARTIN SABELLI & STACEY LEYTON [Vol. 91
subject, the defendant must agree to submit to a psychiatric ex-
amination by experts chosen by the prosecution." Because
submission to a psychiatric examination requires waiver of one's
Fifth Amendment right and implicates fundamental privacy in-
terests, courts have been unwilling to impose such examinations
against a defendant's will, unless necessary to evaluate a defen-
dant's competency. As a practical matter, of course, even if
courts were willing to order defendants to talk to a psychiatrist,
such an order would accomplish little if a defendant were de-
termined to resist all efforts at evaluation. Thus, an attorney's
ability to present evidence of mental illness may be extremely
limited in the face of a determined defendant's opposition.1
92
We propose that there are two ways to address this problem.
First, as Kaczynski's lawyers sought to do before their negotia-
tions broke down, an attorney can present other evidence of
mental illness for the jury's consideration: testimony of friends
and family about the defendant's behavior, records from past
encounters with the mental health system, the defendant's own
ity may be a significant issue at trial, due process requires the state to provide access
to a psychiatrist's assistance. For ineffective assistance of counsel cases on this subject,
see Lloyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992) (failure to obtain independent psy-
chological analysis of defendant was ineffective); Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058 (2d
Cir. 1987) (attorney ineffective for raising extreme emotional disturbance defense
without calling doctor to testify); Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1988) (in-
effective assistance not to call available psychiatric witness).
191 Of course, the defendant may be unwilling to submit even to examination by
defense-chosen psychiatric experts, although both Ferguson and Kaczynski were will-
ing to undergo such examinations. Ferguson later refused to meet with defense psy-
chiatrists. Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 1, at 20.
192See Shull v. South Carolina, No. CA-87-69-16K, 1989 WL 106842 at *4 (4th Cir.
Sept. 5, 1989) (Wilkins, J., concurring) (psychiatric exam serves no purpose if defen-
dant does not cooperate); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1987)
(defendant's refusal to submit to psychiatric interviews or tests prevented further in-
vestigation of the possibility); Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1287, 1289 (11 th
Cir. 1984) (client's refusal to meet with psychiatrists made mental health defense vir-
tually impossible). See also Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 1 at 21 (arguing that "as a
practical matter, it is impossible to force a psychiatric defense on an unwilling defen-
dant" because the defendant can refuse to cooperate with mental health experts and
insist on contradicting the defense during testimony). A defendant who wishes to
thwart the presentation of evidence of mental illness may also threaten to disrupt
proceedings. See Bonnie, supra note 64, at 1386-87 (describing how a defendant might
sabotage presentation of mitigating evidence). For examples of cases where attorneys
chose not to present mitigating circumstances in part because of threats that the de-
fendant would disrupt the proceedings, see Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 751-52
(1 1h Cir. 1988); People v. Howard, 824 P.2d 1315, (Cal. 1992).
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testimony, and other, non-expert evidence. ' Second, and more
important, we propose implementing a system of bifurcation of
criminal trials that will allow criminal defense attorneys to nego-
tiate mutually acceptable-or at least less objectionable-solutions
with their clients.
B. BIFURCATION OF TRIALS
The deal that was struck between Kaczynski and his defense
attorneys at one point during their struggle over control of the
defense suggests a possible way to accommodate a defendant's
interest in autonomy while vindicating society's interest in jus-
tice. Kaczynski agreed to allow his attorneys to present evidence
of his mental illness as part of a case for mitigation as long as
they refrained from questioning his mental health during the
guilt phase of the trial!' In non-capital trials, however, there
are usually not two stages about which to negotiate-and as long
as a single jury evaluates a defendant's guilt in a unitary pro-
ceeding, there is little room to accommodate the conflicting in-
terests and desires of defendant and defense counsel. For this
reason, we propose that when defense counsel wants to present
evidence of mental illness and a defendant favors a merits-based
defense, bifurcation of the trial be an available option.
Bifurcated trials, in which the jury hears the evidence re-
garding whether the defendant committed the acts that com-
19s In the Kaczynski case, defense attorneys planned to show the jury the tiny cabin
in which he had lived for years as part of their demonstration that he vs mentally ill.
See MEuo, supra note 2, at 34-35. In a recent well-publicized case involving an insan-
ity defense, the defense closed its case by showing the jury a videotape of the defen-
dant's confession to pushing a woman in front of a moving subway train, on the
theory that the jury would see signs of his mental illness in his manner of speaking
and discussion of the crime. See David Rohde, Defense Rests Murder Case ith a Video
Confession, N.Y. Tims, Oct. 22, 1999, at B3. Cf Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170,
1173-74 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to present testimony by Vietnam veterans to bolster expert testimony about de-
fendant's post-traumatic stress disorder). For a study suggesting that expert testi-
mony may not be as important as most lawyers consider it, see Scott E. Sundby. The
Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83
VA. L. REV. 1109 (1997).
'" See Dr. SallyJohnson, supra note 2, at *2, United States v. Kaczynski, No. CRS-96-
259GEB, 1998 WL 611123 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 1998); Order, United States v. Kacz)n-
ski, No. CR-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 226796, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 1998); Order,
United States v. Kaczynski, No. CR-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 27836, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
20, 1998).
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prise the offense and renders a verdict on this aspect of the guilt
determination before hearing evidence on the question whether
the defendant was legally insane at the time that he did so, have
already been utilized in some types of cases in a number of ju-
risdictions.' 9 In these bifurcated proceedings, during the first
phase of the trial the defendant is presumed sane and the jury
determines whether the prosecution has demonstrated beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the acts at is-
sue. During the second 6phase, the jury evaluates the defen-
dant's mental culpability.'9
In United States v. Duran,197 the District of Columbia Circuit
articulated the primary justification for bifurcated trials: when a
merits-based defense and an insanity defense are both substan-
tial and incompatible, and the jury could not hear evidence
without seriously undermining one of the two defenses, a bifur-
cated proceeding is only fair way to allow the presentation of
both theories of the case. Bifurcated trials are also utilized to
address the problem that arises when psychiatric testimony rele-
vant to the sanity of the defendant may also establish the defen-
dant's guilt of the crime.'9"
195 See Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979); Post v. State, 580 P.2d 304
(Alaska 1978) People v. Villarreal, 213 Cal.Rptr. 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); People v.
Worthy, 167 Cal.Rptr. 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338
(Colo. 1981); People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1983); Goudy v. United States,
495 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1985), as amended by 505 A.2d 461 (D.C. 1986); State v. Glenner,
513 A.2d 1361 (Me. 1986); Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1988); Common-
wealth v. Siegfriedt, 522 N.E.2d 970 (Mass.1988); State v. Khan, 417 A.2d 585 (N.J.
1980); State v. Leach, 370 N.W.2d 240 (Wis. 1985); State v. Repp, 362 N.W.2d 415
(Wis. 1985). See also People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1983) (sanity determina-
tion precedes guilt phase). But cf. Dutton v. State, 434 So.2d 853 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983); Gruzen v. State, 634 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1982); Edison v. State, 256 Ga. 67 (Ga.
1986); People v. Alerte, 458 N.E.2d 1106 (Ill. App. Ct.. 1983); State v. Gray, 351 S.2d
448 (La. 1977); McKenzie v. Osborne, 640 P.2d 368 (Mont. 1981); State v. Haseen,
468 A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 818 (R.I.
1986).
196 See People v. Villarreal, 213 Cal.Rptr. 179; State v. Brink, 500 N.W.2d 799
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993); 21 AM.JUR.2D CRIMINAL LAw § 70 (1998).
197 96 F.3d 1495, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
198 See DeVine v. Solem, 815 F.2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir. 1987) (bifurcating sanity
and guilt phases of trial is better practice because it avoids the problem of determin-
ing whether evidence offered on sanity issue is actually presented to establish guilt);
United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (bifurcated trial
should be granted based on government psychiatrist's testimony about admissions of
defendant during examination); State ex reL LaFollette v. Raskin, 150 N.W.2d 318
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Thus, the mechanism to bifurcate trials already exists in
mostjurisdictions. We propose an additional justification for bi-
furcation: when the accused wants to raise a merits-based de-
fense and/or deny having committed the acts that comprise the
offense, and the attorney instead plans to raise an insanity de-
fense, the court should bifurcate the trial to allow presentation
of both defenses. '" In order for this proposal to effectively ad-
dress the problem discussed in this article, a change in the stan-
dard by which courts judge the appropriateness of bifurcation
would be required. Currently, courts generally authorize a bi-
furcated proceeding only when the evidence supporting the
merits-based defense is substantial200 However, in cases involv-
ing a conflict between a defendant and defense counsel over
which theory of the defense should be presented, a defendant's
insistence on pursuing a merits-based defense is often irrational.
(Wis. 1967) (defendant who made inculpatory statements to examining doctor vms
entitled to "sequential" trial on guilt and sanity). Similarly, bifurcation has been up-
held as a means to allow a co-defendant to testify as to the defendant's sanity without
undergoing cross-examination on the merits. See United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d
1145, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
199 In at least one case, a court has accepted such ajustification for bifurcation. See
United States v. Ashe, 427 F.2d 626, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (court should have bifur-
cated trial when it imposed insanity defense over objection of defendant, who pre-
ferred defense based on merits).
200 Most jurisdictions impose the requirement that both the insanity defense and
the merits-based defense be supported by substantial evidence, and have concluded
that challenges to the sufficiency of the prosecution's proof do not justify bifurcation.
See Duran, 96 F.3d at 1499-1500 (bifurcation appropriate only when defense on merits
is substantial and not when defendant "merely 'puts the government to its proof.'")
(citation omitted); Garrett v. State, 320 A.2d 745 (Del. 1974) (refusal of bifurcation
upheld when defense on merits was insubstantial); People v. Robinson, 429 N.E.2d
1356 (Ill. 1981) (denial of bifurcation ras proper when no evidence supported claim
of self defense); People v. Glenn, 599 N.E.2d 1220 (I1. App. Ct. 1992) (affirming de-
nial of bifurcation when defendant lacked merits-based defense but merely sought to
challenge sufficiency of evidence); State v. Jenkins, 412 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1987) (bi-
furcation properly refused when alibi defense was insubstantial); State v. Monk. 305
S.E.2d 755 (N.C. 1983) (challenge to circumstantial evidence did not justif, bifurca-
tion when no defense on merits was raised); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 425 A.2d
352 (Pa. 1981) (appropriateness of bifurcation depends on "substantiality" of insanity
defense); State v.Jeppeson, 776 P.2d 1372 (Wa. CL App. 1989) (upholding denial of
bifurcation when self defense claim was unreasonable and insubstantial); State v.
Lusk, 354 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1987) (defendant not entitled to bifurcated trial unless
unitary trial would result in prejudice and defendant has substantial evidence sup-
porting insanity and other defense); State v. Boyd, 280 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1981) (mo-
tion for bifurcation should be granted if both defenses are substantial and
presentation of both at unitary trial would be prejudicial).
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In such cases, the purpose of the bifurcation is to vindicate the
defendant's autonomy interest, rather than to avoid prejudice
to a potential merits-based defense. Therefore, a defendant's
desire to challenge the prosecution's proof or to raise a merits-
based defense that is not supported by substantial evidence
should also justify bifurcation. Furthermore, because the need
for bifurcation will rest on defense counsel's assessment of the
sanity of the defendant and the nature of the conflict over con-
trol of the defense, a court's discretion to deny a motion for bi-
furcation should be severely constrained. An in camera proffer
by defense counsel that he believes the defendant to have a
strong mental health defense and that the defendant insists
upon presenting a merits-based defense should be sufficient to
require bifurcation.
We propose allowing a single jury to hear both phases of the
bifurcated trial. While courts should have the discretion to em-
panel a separate jury for the sanity phase, a rule requiring this
practice may not be necessary. It is possible, however, that a
jury that hears the first phase (including an irrational denial of
guilt) may be less favorably disposed toward a defendant's later
assertion of a mental health defense. This may be a risk in some
cases, but it is more probable that the irrationality of the de-
fense in the first phase of the bifurcated trial may in some sense
support the defense asserted in the second phase.
C. FARETTA
Even a system of bifurcation will not adequately address
cases in which a defendant seeks to avoid the presentation of
evidence of mental illness at all costs; nor will it solve the prob-
lem facing an attorney who seeks to present mitigation evidence
that a defendant wishes to suppress. Under current law, a de-
fendant who refuses to acquiesce to losing control of the de-
fense may thwart defense counsel entirely by invoking his Faretta
right to self representation and firing his attorney. To observers
of or participants in the criminal justice system, the distortion of
justice that results when a mentally ill defendant represents
himself is all too apparent. We therefore advocate that vindica-
tion of the justice interest requires severely constraining a de-
fendant's right to represent himself at trial or at sentencing.
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For these reasons, we propose reconsideration of Faretta v.
California.20' Justice Brennan, who authored Faretta, focused on
the notion of individual autonomy and self expression. Faretta
was decided, of course, in an era in which political trials were
more common and liberals found themselves on the side of de-
fendants who sought to use their trials to make political state-
ments rather than to gain acquittal. " 2 Those opposed to the
right to self representation, largely conservative jurists, articu-
lated a concern for the potential for "abuse" of the criminal
process by politically radicalized criminal defendants. Decades
later, it is apparent that the Faretta right has appealed to men-
tally ill criminal defendants more often than it has to their po-
litically motivated counterparts. Justice Brennan's autonomy-
oriented jurisprudence seems to serve primarily to empower
self-immolation via litigation rather than to protect political dis-
sent. Faretta, we argue, has overstayed its ambiguous welcome.
Similar concerns regarding the meaninglessness of trials in-
volving self representation have caused other participants in the
legal system to question the legitimacy and wisdom of Faretta.'f
201 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Sixth Amendment, the constitutional textual basis of
the Faretta opinion, does not expressly establish a right to self representation. The
Faretta majority found the right to self representation to be implied by the structure of
the Sixth Amendment, the history of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence, and
the notion of individual autonomy. With respect to the structural basis for the right.
the Faretta majority concluded that the right to self representation is implied by the
individual rights enumerated in the Amendment. In the dissenting words of Justice
Blackmun, the majority "reason[ed] that because the accused has a personal right to
'a defense as we know it,' he necessarily has a right to make that defense personally."
Id. at 848 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
202 Two prominent examples were the 1968 trial of two Catholic Priests, the Berri-
gan brothers, and the 1969 trial of the Chicago Eight. The Berrigan brothers de-
fended themselves based on their opposition to the Vietnam War. The Chicago Eight
also offered a political defense and one of their number, Bobby Scale, v,,as bound and
gagged after repeatedly asserting his right to self representation and was subsequently
removed from the trial. Laurie Levenson, Cases of the Centuly, 33 LOY. L.A. L REV.
585, 594-95 & nn.26-27 (2000).
203 Some have suggested hybrid representation, in which a criminal defendant and
her attorney serve as co-counsel, as a means to protect pro sedefendants' right to a fair
trial without overruling Faretta. See, eg., Kenneth Sogabe, Exercising the Right to Self
Representation in United States v. Farhad: Issues in Waiving a Criminal Defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to Counse4 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. RE%. 129 (2000); Marie Williams,
The Pro Se Criminal Defendant, Standby Counse4 and the Judge: A Proposal for Better-Defined
Roles, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 789 (2000). This proposal would generally not address the
cases with which this paper is concerned: those in which the defendant is seeking to
2000]
MARTIN SABELLI & STA CEY LEYTON [Vol. 91
In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court rejected a proposed ex-
tension of the right of self representation to the appellate con-
text, and gave indications that reconsideration of Faretta's
underpinnings may be on the horizon.'" Even at the trial stage
Faretta has been challenged in light of mounting evidence that it
empowers criminal defendants to subvert, intentionally or unin-
205tentionally, the process.
We believe that in almost no case can a defendant obtain a
fair trial when representing himself. As discussed earlier, in an
analogous area, the courts have determined that the impossibil-
ity of obtaining a fair trial when counsel has a conflict of interest
justifies overriding the defendant's right to choose her own at-
torney. Judge Reinhardt characterizes this jurisprudence as
"recogniz[ing] that individual Sixth Amendment rights are sub-
block presentation of crucial evidence and control the theory of the defense. We also
believe it to be an ineffective measure that in many cases requires defense counsel to
participate in grossly unfair trials and thereby violate their ethical responsibilities.
204 See Martinez v. Court of Appeals of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000). In Faretta,
the Court had identified three bases for the right to self representation at the trial
stage: the structure of the Sixth Amendment, the history of Anglo-American criminal
jurisprudence, and the notion of individual autonomy. In Martinez, the Court con-
cluded that the Sixth Amendment refers solely to trial rights and therefore does not
apply on appeal, that the historical evidence relied upon in Faretta does not apply to
the appellate stage, and that any individual right to self representation on appeal
based upon autonomy principles must be grounded in the Due Process Clause. The
Martinez Court concluded that self representation on appeal is not a necessary com-
ponent of fairness, given the practices prevailing today. Concretely, the Court rea-
soned that the risk of disloyalty (or appearance of disloyalty) by court-appointed
counsel does not justify recognition of such a right. Id. at 156-63. In reaching this
conclusion, the Martinez Court balanced the limitation on autonomy against the
"government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency." Id. at 162.
This reasoning carries two significant implications: First, the Court's analysis sug-
gests that autonomy is not an abstract principle but a concept defined by reference to
the real or perceived threat of disloyalty. Second, the Court's conclusion that auton-
omy alone does not justify a right to self representation on appeal implies a philo-
sophical willingness to balance autonomy against other values implicated in the
criminal justice process. Finally, the Court's analysis suggests that the other values
implicated in the appellate process have constitutional significance.
205 In Martinez, Justice Breyer noted that judges have raised concerns about the
lack of fairness which results from Faretta but that empirical evidence has yet to be
collected. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 164 (Breyer, J., concurring). Two other concurring
justices appeared to read the majority opinion as calling Faretta itself into question.
Justice Kennedy made it a point to note that he does not believe it necessary to recon-
sider Faretta. Id.Justice Scalia opined that he "do[es] not share the apparent skepti-
cism of today's opinion regarding Faretta." Id. at 165.
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ordinate to society's interest in assuring fair trials." We reach
the similar conclusion that the impossibility of obtaining a fair
trial also justifies overriding the defendant's right to represent
herself. We note, in this respect, that the Supreme Court has
never directly addressed this inevitable conflict and held that
autonomy overrides due process in cases of self representation;
rather, the Court has maintained an indefensible practice of si-
lence in the face of the fundamental violation of due process
that inevitably ensues when a defendant stands trial without the
protection of counsel. We propose an end to this silence and
an admission that the experiment with Faretta has been a dismal
failure.
Our proposal does not mean that self representation will be
banished henceforth never to travel our legal landscape again.
We propose eliminating the right, not the opportunity, and we
do so in order to limit self representation to individuals who can
competently represent themselves. Under our proposal, crimi-
nal defendants would have the opportunity to apply to the trial
court for the opportunity to represent themselves just as they
currently apply for substitution of counsel when they are not sat-
isfied with their attorney. This application process would, of
course, allow the trial court great discretion in ruling on a self
representation application, and some might object that this dis-
cretion would pose an obstacle to radical or innovative legal de-
fense strategies. This criticism ignores the reality of the
courtroom. In practice, the obstacle to such radicalism and in-
novation is the trial court's determination of the legality of a
radical or innovative defense (that is, the relevance of the prof-
fered argument to the charge) and the establishment of a fac-
tual basis at trial for such a defense. These inquiries by the trial
court-not the denial of self representation-pose the most im-
portant obstacles to radical lawyering, and, in fact, trained and
experienced lawyers have succeeded much more often than pro
se defendants in expanding the frontiers of the law.
D. REFORM OF THE COMPETENCY STANDARD
One final proposal for preventing defendants from sabotag-
ing their own defense due to mental illness is worth addressing:
206United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
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reform of the competency standard so that it tests not only the
defendant's comprehension of the procedures but also the de-
fendant's ability to make reasoned decisions. The current com-
petency standard, which evaluates whether the defendant has
"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a rea-
sonable degree of rational understanding... [and] a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him,"20 7
has been criticized as woefully inadequate.0 8 Certainly, the ex-
amples of clearly delusional defendants who have been found
competent to stand trial demonstrate the inadequacy of this in-
quiry in protecting a defendant's right to due process.0 9 The
result of the minimal nature of the competency standard is that
attorneys often seriously doubt the ability of clients who have
been found competent to stand trial to participate in their own
defense.2 0 While evaluation of specific proposals is beyond the
scope of this undertaking, we do note that experts in the field
have proposed competency examinations that would test "deci-
sional competence" rather than mere comprehension," ' meas-ure ability to understand the implications of information rather
207Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (quoting Solicitor
General). See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (expanding inquiry to
require examination of whether defendant can understand the proceedings, consult
with his lawyer, and assist in preparing a defense).
208 See Kuby & Kunstler, supra note 1, at 24-25; see also supra notes 22-23 and ac-
companying text.
209The Ferguson case was of course the most notable example. See also supra note
104.
210See supra note 22.
211 See Richard Bonnie, supra note 23, at 548. Bonnie proposes that the decisional
competence inquiry would test client ability to communicate a decision or prefer-
ence, understand relevant information, appreciate the importance of this informa-
tion as it relates to his own case, and use the information to make a reasoned
decision. The test for decisional competence would be based on the MacArthur
Treatment Competence Study's proposed test, which examines competency to make
decisions about medical treatment. Id. at 570-76. See also Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546, 1549-51 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendant's delusional state required
finding of incompetence, since competence requires not only a factual understand-
ing of courtroom proceedings, but a rational one). In Lafferty, the court found that
the defendant's delusional beliefs affected his ability to make decisions that would
further his best interests; for example, the defendant had rejected a mental health
defense. Id at 1555-56.
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than merely "'who sits where' in a courtroom," 2 and adjust the
nature of the inquiry based on the context in which the ques-
tion regarding the defendant's competence has arisen.
Raising the standard does, however, have potentially adverse
consequences for mentally ill criminal defendants. An adjudica-
tion of incompetence does not result in obtaining freedom
from criminal responsibility, but instead in involuntary psychiat-
ric treatment and confinement, at least until a court is satisfied
that a defendant has regained her competency. 4 An adjudica-
212 Fox Butterfield, Unabom Trial Highlighting Ambiguity of Mental Illness, N.Y. TDIES,
Jan. 11, 1998, at Al (discussing five-year MacArthur Treatment Competency Study's
proposed model to test ability to communicate choices, understand relevant informa-
tion, appreciate the nature and likely consequences of a situation, and make rea-
soned choices among legal alternatives).
213 Ronald Roesch, et. al., Conceptualizing and Assessing Competency to Stand Trial: Im-
plications and Applications of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Model 2 PSYCHoL. PUa.
POL'Y& L. 96, 96, 100 (1996). Richard Bonnie has proposed that "the legal test for
competence should differ according to whether the defendant follows or rejects
counsel's advice." Bonnie, supra note 23, at 576. He urges that defendants who pass
the Dusky standard but fail to demonstrate decisional competence (ability to make a
reasoned choice) should be allowed to proceed to trial with the attorney as a surro-
gate decision-maker, except that an attorney would not be allowed to make decisions
that are constitutionally allocated to a defendant. Id. at 546-47, 559, 576-78, 586, 601.
See also Winick, supra note 21, at 608 (suggesting that attorney disagreement with cli-
ent over important decisions such as what plea to enter should shift the presumption
of incompetence). This distinction parallels that made in the context of medical
treatment, "where patients who assent to their clinicians' recommendations are
treated as requiring less in the way of competence than those who refuse to do so."
Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: A Summary of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study and
an Introduction to the Special Theme, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L 3, 14 (1996); see also
BruceJ. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L REv. 921. 963-64
(1985).
214The Supreme Court has held that due process limits the length of confinement
that an incompetent individual can be subjected to "the reasonable period of time
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain
that capacity in the foreseeable future." Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
However, if it is improbable that a defendant will attain competency, he may then
face indefinite institutionalization under civil commitment proceedings. See 1d. at
738. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4141(d); 21 A.JuR. 2D CmImAL LAw § 116 (1998). But see
Winick, supra note 21, at 580 (discussing lengthy confinement of incompetent defen-
dants facing misdemeanor charges and noting that, "[a] Ithough Jadon marked an
end to the most egregious cases of indefinite incompetency commitment, many states
have responded insufficiently to the Court's decision, and abuses persist."); Norma
Schrock, Defense Counsel's Role in Determining Competency to Stand Trial, 9 GEo.J. LEc-tL
ETrscs 639 n.1 (1996) (citing cases in which defendants have been institutionalized
for periods longer than the maximum sentence available for the underlying crime
because they were found incompetent and then civilly committed).
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tion of incompetency can, therefore, result in lengthy confine-
ment without any adjudication of guilt, especially in cases in
which a defendant's mental illness is resistant to treatment. 5
We also do not believe that increasing the competency
standard for individuals who want to represent themselves is a
practical avenue, unless Faretta is reconsidered. While Godinez
did not explicitly foreclose statutory efforts to bifurcate the
competency standard,1 as long as Faretta remains the law of the
land, these efforts will encounter the objection that they intrude
upon defendants' right to self representation and are therefore
unconstitutional. Furthermore, we do not believe that such
proposals go far enough in addressing the problems posed
when defendants elect to represent themselves. The justifica-
tion underlying an enhanced competency standard is that the
current standard for competency measures a defendant's ability
to assist an attorney but fails to assess a defendant's capability to
go at it alone, without the assistance of counsel. In the words of
Justice Blackmun, "[a] person who is 'competent' to play bas-
215 One commentator has suggested that the potential for long term commitment
can be circumvented by allowing criminal defendants to waive incompetency- that is,
to elect to proceed to trial despite being deemed incompetent. Winick, supra note
21. The concept of "waiver," however, implies a knowing, voluntary and intelligent
choice-a contradiction given that the individual who is making the "choice" has been
deemed incompetent to participate in her defense. The only situation of this type
that would seem fair is one in which a competent defendant elects to become incom-
petent during trial for a strategic purpose: e.g., allowing the jury to observe her con-
duct when she is not medicated or improperly medicated. This strategy was pursued
in another case that attracted substantial public attention: the second murder trial of
Andrew Goldstein, charged with murder for pushing a young woman to her death in
front of a New York City subway. The strategy unraveled after Goldstein punched a
social worker and was ordered to resume taking his medication. See Julian Barnes,
Second Murder Trial Opens in Subway Shoving Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000 at B3;Julian
Barnes, Insanity Defense Fails for Man Who Threw Woman Onto Track, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2000 at Al.
216See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402 ("While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful
to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to
adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the
Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements."). See also Alan
Felthous, The Right to Represent Oneself Incompetently: Competency to Waive Counsel and
Conduct One's Own Defense Before and After Godinez, 18 MENTAL & PHYsIcAL DISABIIrv
L. REP. 105, 109 (1994) (concluding that Godinez does not limit state legislative efforts
to design more stringent tests of voluntariness and competence for defendants who
seek to represent themselves).
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ketball is not thereby 'competent' to play the violin."217 While
imposition of a higher standard of competency would poten-
tially eliminate a category of the most egregious cases-those in
which a defendant's mental illness or impairment renders him
clearly unable to present a defense at trial-it would leave broad
discretion in individual judges' hands, render the denial or
grant of self representation an appealable issue in almost every
case in which it is at issue, and fall to address those cases that
are less obviously egregious but just as fundamentally unfair.
V. CONCLUSION
Those who are critical of our proposal may argue that we
are attempting to find a way to appease a defendant's autonomy
interest while refusing to accord it the respect it deserves. We
do not, however, advocate a uniform approach to all cases. In
most cases, defendants are clear on their interests and values
and, when disagreement arises between counsel and client, the
client's wishes should be respected.2"8 Rather, we are concerned
with a specific category of cases: those in which a defendant's
ability to articulate, and decide upon, his or her interests is fun-
damentally tainted by mental illness.1 9 In these cases, we be-
lieve that the autonomy interest is significantly weakened as a
consequence of illness.
Of course, identifying and distinguishing the cases in which
a defendant's mental illness justifies overriding his autonomy is
not always easy. Cases in which a defendant's depression causes
him to object to presentation of any case for mitigation will be
more difficult to evaluate than those in which a defendant is
clearly delusional. And cases such as the Unabomber will push
the limits of the difference between an unpopular political phi-
losophy and mental illness itself.
We believe, however, that the difficulty of making such a
distinction does not justify inaction in the face of the funda-
217 Godinez. 509 U.S. at 413 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
218Of course, the rationale behind our proposals may have implications beyond
the context of mental illness. For example, a defendant who elects to take responsi-
bility for a crime that someone else has committed, in order to obtain financial re-
muneration or avoid violence, is utilizing the criminal justice system to reach an
unfair result. In these cases, an attorney would legitimately object to being used to
thwart a defendant's right to a fair trial.
219 This category is far from a narrow one. See supra note 69.
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mental unfairness that results when a mentally ill defendant's
wishes are followed uncritically. Rather, we believe that the de-
fendant's lawyer is in the best position to judge whether a de-
fendant's objections to presentation of evidence are rooted in
legitimate concerns or in interests or desires that the judicial
system should not place above all other interests. Defense
counsel is most familiar with both the circumstances of the
criminal case and with the defendant, and is therefore best able
to judge whether the defendant's objection is responsive to le-
gitimate, rational concerns or is rooted in mental illness or
some other invalid factor. For this reason, a court should be ex-
tremely reluctant to intrude upon the attorney-client relation-
ship other than to clarify, when necessary, that defense counsel
is acting responsibly in controlling the decision whether to pre-
sent relevant evidence of diminished capacity or mitigating cir-
cumstances.
While we propose a departure from the current legal rules
for cases in which a defendant engages in open conflict with his
attorney over presentation of evidence of mental illness, this
may not be such a dramatic departure from current norms of at-
torney-client relations in the majority of cases involving mentally
ill defendants. When defendants are less able or determined to
fight their attorneys for control of the defense than in a case
such as Kaczynski's, attorneys often thwart client wishes by sim-
ply declining to consult their clients about the decision. An
empirical study of attorney behavior conducted by Richard
Bonnie found that in over one-third of the cases in which attor-
neys raised an insanity defense, the lawyers "pre-empted their
clients participation" and "made the decision to pursue the in-
sanity defense on their own, without meaningful client partici-
pation. ,220 Rather than require defense attorneys to subvert
their ethical obligations in cases involving this type of client,
and accede to their stronger-willed clients' wishes in order to
avoid an invocation of Faretta, legal authorities should recognize
220Bonnie et al., supra note 22, at 56-57. When the attorneys did consult their cli-
ents, the clients' involvement in the decision was fairly minimal. See id. at 58. The
justifications for this absence of consultation were either that the attorneys had con-
cluded that "the insanity defense was the only real choice and that there was nothing
to discuss... [or] they doubted their clients' competence to participate meaningfully
in the decision-making process." Id. at 57, 60. Another survey of insanity defenses in
Colorado estimated that in one-third of the cases the defense was imposed over the
defendant's wishes. See Miller et al, supra, note 33, at 501.
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the primacy of society's interest in justice and acknowledge that
this interest trumps the limited autonomy of a mentally ill de-
fendant.
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